HC seeks Punjab govt reply 22 Dec 2007, 0159 hrs IST,Vishal Sharma
Coming to the rescue of hapless villagers in Punjab, who are virtually drinking poison in the name of water, the Punjab and Haryana High Court issued a notice of motion to the state for January 22, on Friday. The court did this while treating a report published on December 18 in the TOI as a public interest litigation (PIL). Expressing anguish over the horrific state of affairs shown through the TOI report based on a PGIMER, Chandigarh, inquiry spanning two years, the division bench, comprising chief justice Vijender Jain and justice Mahesh Grover, sought Punjab’s reply on the issue. The report had caught the high court’s attention on December 18 itself. The division bench, comprising justices KS Garewal and Daya Chaudhary, had termed the contents of the report as "frightening" reflection on the scenario prevailing in Punjab’s villages. Justices Garewal and Chaudhary, made a quick note of the points of concern as highlighted in the report and referred the matter to the chief justice requesting him to examine the contents of the report and treat it as a PIL. The PGIMER team of experts had probed the effects of industrial waste and pesticides on human health in 25 Punjab villages located near five open drains. The study found varying degrees of DNA mutation in 65% of the blood samples taken. It also detected genetic damage in some cases. That was not all. The drinking water in these villages had turned toxic due to a high concentration of heavy metals such as mercury, copper, cadmium, chromium and lead. The report had brought to fore the fact of numbness, miscarriages and skin ailments affecting the residents of Mahal village in Amritsar district. The principal investigator, Dr JS Thakur, had outlined the possible scenarios caused by genotoxicity, a condition in which lethal chemicals gather in the body leading to DNA damage. The news report had stated that in future, more children will be born with congenital malformations like cleft lip, half skull or no skull, growth retardation. Pregnant women will have more sudden, "spontaneous" abortions, the report said.
Friday, December 21, 2007
77,000 judges needed to clear backlog: CJI
77,000 judges needed to clear backlog: CJI 22 Dec 2007, 0038 hrs IST,Swati Deshpande,TNN
MUMBAI: In May 2007, California's population was almost touching 38 million. In India, that's the number of cases pending in courts across the country. Providing this peculiar comparison was none other than the Chief Justice of India, K G Balakrishnan, who on Friday also noted that India has only 12,000 judges — 2,000 short of the sanctioned strength of 14,000. As a result, there are over 2.5 crore cases pending in the lower courts, 37 lakh in HCs and 46,000 in the SC. "We need one judge for 500 cases to clear the backlog — that would mean 77,664 judges. At best, however, the judges' strength can be pushed up a few thousand more. We need more courts and more budget for the judiciary," said the CJI after a foundation-stone laying ceremony at Uttan for the Maharashtra Judicial Academy and the Indian Mediation Centre and Training Institute-Mumbai. The Uttan site is on the outskirts of Mumbai, close to Gorai beach, and holds a bust of freedom fighter barrister Joseph Baptista, legal advisor to Lokmanya Tilak and Mumbai mayor in 1925-26. The CJI said every state should have a judicial academy and the one to come up in Maharashtra should be good since the state had "one of the best legal education and a very high judicial calibre." He stressed on the need for judges to be trained on "court -management" skills and noted that vacancies notwithstanding, many magistrates and lower court judges were found lacking in even basic judicial knowledge especially on criminal procedures. He said some judges don't even know how many cases are pending before them, but each judge "should know how long it would take him to dispose of the cases before him
MUMBAI: In May 2007, California's population was almost touching 38 million. In India, that's the number of cases pending in courts across the country. Providing this peculiar comparison was none other than the Chief Justice of India, K G Balakrishnan, who on Friday also noted that India has only 12,000 judges — 2,000 short of the sanctioned strength of 14,000. As a result, there are over 2.5 crore cases pending in the lower courts, 37 lakh in HCs and 46,000 in the SC. "We need one judge for 500 cases to clear the backlog — that would mean 77,664 judges. At best, however, the judges' strength can be pushed up a few thousand more. We need more courts and more budget for the judiciary," said the CJI after a foundation-stone laying ceremony at Uttan for the Maharashtra Judicial Academy and the Indian Mediation Centre and Training Institute-Mumbai. The Uttan site is on the outskirts of Mumbai, close to Gorai beach, and holds a bust of freedom fighter barrister Joseph Baptista, legal advisor to Lokmanya Tilak and Mumbai mayor in 1925-26. The CJI said every state should have a judicial academy and the one to come up in Maharashtra should be good since the state had "one of the best legal education and a very high judicial calibre." He stressed on the need for judges to be trained on "court -management" skills and noted that vacancies notwithstanding, many magistrates and lower court judges were found lacking in even basic judicial knowledge especially on criminal procedures. He said some judges don't even know how many cases are pending before them, but each judge "should know how long it would take him to dispose of the cases before him
HIGH COURT STAYS THE ORDER OF COMPENSATION TO AIR LINE PASSENGERS GIVEN BY STATE CONSUMER REDRESSAL FORUM
HC stays stiff fine on airline21 Dec 2007, 0308 hrs IST,TNN
Keeping with the trend of orders by the State Consumer Commission being stayed due to its jurisdiction being challenged, Delhi High Court on Thursday stayed a consumer commission order against GoAir airline. The commission had ordered the firm which operates the no-frills airline GoAir to pay Rs 15,000 to each passenger of a flight that was cancelled due to a technical snag. The order had come on the petition of one affected consumer who claimed the cancellation cost him harassment and mental agony. However, justice Pradeep Nandrajog stayed the order on a petition filed by GoAirlines challenging the commission’s jurisdiction. HC also issued notice to Yogesh Kumar, on whose petition the commission had passed its order and directed him to respond by April next year. Senior advocate Rajiv Nayyar, appearing for the airline, contended that state commission has no power to proceed in such a sweeping fashion under section 14 (1)(hb) of the Consumer Protection Act 1986. Even if such a power existed, the commission could not have decided to extend the benefit of its order to all other passengers of the flight without giving the airline an opportunity to defend itself, the advocate argued. Criticising the commission further, Nayyar contended the commission failed to take into account that the consumer Yogesh Kumar had failed to provide his contact number as required during the booking of the flight. The petitioner also argued that the commission completely ignored the terms and conditions which had been accepted by Kumar before booking the ticket. On November 12, the commission had passed the order in connection with a compensation application filed by Kumar, passenger of the cancelled flight. Apart from awarding relief to the complainant, the commission went on to extend the benefit of its order to all other passengers of the flight who couldn’t travel due to cancellation of flight but who had not approached the commission for relief. Kumar had awarded a compensation of Rs 17,000 by district forum, which was challenged in the commission by the airline which maintained that since Kumar had bought the ticket from an agent, who was duly informed about the cancellation, no liability could be imputed on it.
Keeping with the trend of orders by the State Consumer Commission being stayed due to its jurisdiction being challenged, Delhi High Court on Thursday stayed a consumer commission order against GoAir airline. The commission had ordered the firm which operates the no-frills airline GoAir to pay Rs 15,000 to each passenger of a flight that was cancelled due to a technical snag. The order had come on the petition of one affected consumer who claimed the cancellation cost him harassment and mental agony. However, justice Pradeep Nandrajog stayed the order on a petition filed by GoAirlines challenging the commission’s jurisdiction. HC also issued notice to Yogesh Kumar, on whose petition the commission had passed its order and directed him to respond by April next year. Senior advocate Rajiv Nayyar, appearing for the airline, contended that state commission has no power to proceed in such a sweeping fashion under section 14 (1)(hb) of the Consumer Protection Act 1986. Even if such a power existed, the commission could not have decided to extend the benefit of its order to all other passengers of the flight without giving the airline an opportunity to defend itself, the advocate argued. Criticising the commission further, Nayyar contended the commission failed to take into account that the consumer Yogesh Kumar had failed to provide his contact number as required during the booking of the flight. The petitioner also argued that the commission completely ignored the terms and conditions which had been accepted by Kumar before booking the ticket. On November 12, the commission had passed the order in connection with a compensation application filed by Kumar, passenger of the cancelled flight. Apart from awarding relief to the complainant, the commission went on to extend the benefit of its order to all other passengers of the flight who couldn’t travel due to cancellation of flight but who had not approached the commission for relief. Kumar had awarded a compensation of Rs 17,000 by district forum, which was challenged in the commission by the airline which maintained that since Kumar had bought the ticket from an agent, who was duly informed about the cancellation, no liability could be imputed on it.
Social stigma was the overriding factor behind the motive of the brutal killing ; Mother gets lifer for killing newborn
Mother gets lifer for killing newborn
Judgment comes 14 years after the incident;
mother-in-law had launched complaint
CUTTACK: Sanju Bhuyan, a 35-year-old married woman was awarded life imprisonment for killing her own newborn child just hours of her birth.
The judgment came 14 years after the incident that took place on October 13, 1993 in Kusumbi village under Salipur police station of this district, about 25 km from here.
A lower court here although, acknowledged the brutal killing to be “rarest of rare” but stopped short of sentencing the accused a death penalty.
“Social stigma was the overriding factor behind the motive of the brutal killing which by any means merits to be categorised as rarest of rare but considering the social factors, a simple life imprisonment would meet the justice”, said the district ad hoc additional sessions judge N.P.Rout in his judgment delivered on Thursday.Prosecution
The prosecution inter alia states that Sanju Bhuyan was married to one Akshya Bhuyan of Salipur on July 10, 1993.
Within a fortnight of the marriage, Akshaya left for Kolkata where he worked in a hotel.
But Sanju, who was staying with her mother-in-law and sister-in-law delivered a healthy baby girl on October 13 of the same year, exactly after three months of her marriage.
Fearing social banishment, Sanju killed her newborn just minutes after the birth and dumped it in their backyard. But her evil design could not escape the watchful eyes of her suspicious mother-in-law Oshi Dei.
Following complaints from Oshi Dei, the local police after registering a case retrieved the body of the child and sent for post mortem.
The post mortem report confirmed that the child had died from strangulation. Sanju, who was immediately arrested, also confessed during interrogation that she had mauled the baby and wanted to get rid of her child as the baby was born for an extramarital relationship she had before her marriage to Akshaya, the prosecution said.
Judgment comes 14 years after the incident;
mother-in-law had launched complaint
CUTTACK: Sanju Bhuyan, a 35-year-old married woman was awarded life imprisonment for killing her own newborn child just hours of her birth.
The judgment came 14 years after the incident that took place on October 13, 1993 in Kusumbi village under Salipur police station of this district, about 25 km from here.
A lower court here although, acknowledged the brutal killing to be “rarest of rare” but stopped short of sentencing the accused a death penalty.
“Social stigma was the overriding factor behind the motive of the brutal killing which by any means merits to be categorised as rarest of rare but considering the social factors, a simple life imprisonment would meet the justice”, said the district ad hoc additional sessions judge N.P.Rout in his judgment delivered on Thursday.Prosecution
The prosecution inter alia states that Sanju Bhuyan was married to one Akshya Bhuyan of Salipur on July 10, 1993.
Within a fortnight of the marriage, Akshaya left for Kolkata where he worked in a hotel.
But Sanju, who was staying with her mother-in-law and sister-in-law delivered a healthy baby girl on October 13 of the same year, exactly after three months of her marriage.
Fearing social banishment, Sanju killed her newborn just minutes after the birth and dumped it in their backyard. But her evil design could not escape the watchful eyes of her suspicious mother-in-law Oshi Dei.
Following complaints from Oshi Dei, the local police after registering a case retrieved the body of the child and sent for post mortem.
The post mortem report confirmed that the child had died from strangulation. Sanju, who was immediately arrested, also confessed during interrogation that she had mauled the baby and wanted to get rid of her child as the baby was born for an extramarital relationship she had before her marriage to Akshaya, the prosecution said.
Working towards police reforms
Working towards police reforms
Three-day colloquium by Bureau of Police Research throws up new ideas
‘Seven States follow directions by Supreme Court to implement police reforms, while ten do not comply’
‘Media and NGOs must be mobilised towards police reforms’
A three-day colloquium organised by the Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPRD) has ended here. Concluding with several suggestions for the improvement of police force in the country, the sessions dealt with various issues of policing, including reforms and police authors. Beginning with a comparison between the Indian police and their counterparts in the West, the colloquium dealt with other subjects like the police vision, the challenges before the police in the 21st Century, encouraging police authors and taking the process of police reforms ahead.
National Security Adviser M. K. Narayanan said the role of BPRD is more important than ever before in shaping the Indian police and it should take the lead in making the force more professional.
Since the BPRD handles police missions and provides inputs for policy making, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs should take care of the staff shortage and lack of adequate finances, said Mr. Narayanan.
Speaking on the concluding day, former Border Security Force (BSF) Director-General Prakash Singh said the 1984 anti-Sikh riots, the Ayodhya incident of 1992 and the Gujarat riots of 2002 forced him to file a public interest litigation in the Supreme Court seeking directions to the States to implement police reforms.
The Supreme Court directed the States to set up a State Security Commission, establish a Police Establishment Board and Accountability Authority at the State and district levels.
Also, it asked the States to fix the procedure for posting of the Directors-General of Police and also fixing their tenure, besides asking for separating investigations from law and order functions.
Mr. Singh said seven States have complied with the directives and ten have drafted laws to circumvent the implementation of the Supreme Court directives. Bihar, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu are among the non-compliant States, he added.
The former BSF Director-General said public opinion, the media and the non-government organisations have to be mobilised towards police reforms.
“The political opposition to the reforms will have to be neutralised and corrupt, politicised officers will have to be marginalised,” he added.
Earlier, the experts concluded that Indian policing needed to do a lot to match its Western counterparts as latter were not only better equipped technically but also had a more efficient, decentralised structure.
They said the police should work towards partnership with other agencies to become instruments that could be helpful in ensuring social, political and economic justice to the common man.
Speaking about the importance of police leadership, BPRD Director-General Kiran Bedi said the police leadership should not only show the way to their subordinates but also help pave the path ahead.
It was decided during the colloquium that a study by a four-member team be conducted on ‘State of affairs of police families’ and it would be presented at the next colloquium.
On the last day of the colloquium, Ms. Bedi launched the Hindi website of the BPRD. Four police authors were honoured with the G. B. Pant Award.
Three-day colloquium by Bureau of Police Research throws up new ideas
‘Seven States follow directions by Supreme Court to implement police reforms, while ten do not comply’
‘Media and NGOs must be mobilised towards police reforms’
A three-day colloquium organised by the Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPRD) has ended here. Concluding with several suggestions for the improvement of police force in the country, the sessions dealt with various issues of policing, including reforms and police authors. Beginning with a comparison between the Indian police and their counterparts in the West, the colloquium dealt with other subjects like the police vision, the challenges before the police in the 21st Century, encouraging police authors and taking the process of police reforms ahead.
National Security Adviser M. K. Narayanan said the role of BPRD is more important than ever before in shaping the Indian police and it should take the lead in making the force more professional.
Since the BPRD handles police missions and provides inputs for policy making, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs should take care of the staff shortage and lack of adequate finances, said Mr. Narayanan.
Speaking on the concluding day, former Border Security Force (BSF) Director-General Prakash Singh said the 1984 anti-Sikh riots, the Ayodhya incident of 1992 and the Gujarat riots of 2002 forced him to file a public interest litigation in the Supreme Court seeking directions to the States to implement police reforms.
The Supreme Court directed the States to set up a State Security Commission, establish a Police Establishment Board and Accountability Authority at the State and district levels.
Also, it asked the States to fix the procedure for posting of the Directors-General of Police and also fixing their tenure, besides asking for separating investigations from law and order functions.
Mr. Singh said seven States have complied with the directives and ten have drafted laws to circumvent the implementation of the Supreme Court directives. Bihar, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu are among the non-compliant States, he added.
The former BSF Director-General said public opinion, the media and the non-government organisations have to be mobilised towards police reforms.
“The political opposition to the reforms will have to be neutralised and corrupt, politicised officers will have to be marginalised,” he added.
Earlier, the experts concluded that Indian policing needed to do a lot to match its Western counterparts as latter were not only better equipped technically but also had a more efficient, decentralised structure.
They said the police should work towards partnership with other agencies to become instruments that could be helpful in ensuring social, political and economic justice to the common man.
Speaking about the importance of police leadership, BPRD Director-General Kiran Bedi said the police leadership should not only show the way to their subordinates but also help pave the path ahead.
It was decided during the colloquium that a study by a four-member team be conducted on ‘State of affairs of police families’ and it would be presented at the next colloquium.
On the last day of the colloquium, Ms. Bedi launched the Hindi website of the BPRD. Four police authors were honoured with the G. B. Pant Award.
GOOD NEWS FOR LAND LORDS : Tenant can be evicted for abuse, threat: apex court
Tenant can be evicted for abuse, threat: apex court
‘These amount to nuisance and annoyance’
Ruling ends 31-year-old litigation
Tenant has 2 months to vacate
A tenant using filthy language and threatening to kill his landlord or landlady will amount to “nuisance and annoyance” and will be a ground for eviction, the Supreme Court has held.
Causing damage to or altering the rented property without the landlord’s consent will also come within the ambit of “nuisance and annoyance” under the Transfer of Property Act read with the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, said a Bench consisting of Justices R.V. Raveendran and P. Sathasivam. 31-year-old litigation
It gave this ruling, bringing to an end a 31-year-old litigation and ordering the eviction of a tenant, who refused to vacate.
FACTS OF THE CASE
Ranju alias Gautam Ghosh of Kolkata broke a collapsible gate on his rented premises and when landlady Rekha Ghosh protested, he threatened to kill her. A munsif court dismissed her suit for evicting him. The first appellate court, however, ordered his eviction. The Calcutta High Court affirmed this order.Lessee’s obligation
Dismissing the tenant’s appeal, the apex court pointed out that under the Transfer of Property Act, the lessee was bound to keep and maintain the property in as a good condition as it was when he/she was put in possession of it, subject only to the changes caused by reasonable wear and tear or irresistible force.
Writing the judgment, Justice Sathasivam said the cutting of the collapsible gate was photographed and produced before the court. When the landlady and her family protested against the tenant’s action, they were threatened and a police complaint was preferred against him.
The Bench said: “The lower appellate court and the High court adverted to the complaint given to the police and the subsequent criminal proceedings, and came to the conclusion that the respondent [landlady] made out a case for eviction on the ground of nuisance and annoyance; we concur with the said factual finding.”Ground for eviction
Threatening to kill the respondent, and beating up her son and abusing him in filthy language would amount to nuisance and annoyance and be a ground for eviction.
Damaging the collapsible gate and putting up a concrete elevation of the floor would amount to doing acts contrary to the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act.
The Bench granted the tenant two months to vacate.
‘These amount to nuisance and annoyance’
Ruling ends 31-year-old litigation
Tenant has 2 months to vacate
A tenant using filthy language and threatening to kill his landlord or landlady will amount to “nuisance and annoyance” and will be a ground for eviction, the Supreme Court has held.
Causing damage to or altering the rented property without the landlord’s consent will also come within the ambit of “nuisance and annoyance” under the Transfer of Property Act read with the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, said a Bench consisting of Justices R.V. Raveendran and P. Sathasivam. 31-year-old litigation
It gave this ruling, bringing to an end a 31-year-old litigation and ordering the eviction of a tenant, who refused to vacate.
FACTS OF THE CASE
Ranju alias Gautam Ghosh of Kolkata broke a collapsible gate on his rented premises and when landlady Rekha Ghosh protested, he threatened to kill her. A munsif court dismissed her suit for evicting him. The first appellate court, however, ordered his eviction. The Calcutta High Court affirmed this order.Lessee’s obligation
Dismissing the tenant’s appeal, the apex court pointed out that under the Transfer of Property Act, the lessee was bound to keep and maintain the property in as a good condition as it was when he/she was put in possession of it, subject only to the changes caused by reasonable wear and tear or irresistible force.
Writing the judgment, Justice Sathasivam said the cutting of the collapsible gate was photographed and produced before the court. When the landlady and her family protested against the tenant’s action, they were threatened and a police complaint was preferred against him.
The Bench said: “The lower appellate court and the High court adverted to the complaint given to the police and the subsequent criminal proceedings, and came to the conclusion that the respondent [landlady] made out a case for eviction on the ground of nuisance and annoyance; we concur with the said factual finding.”Ground for eviction
Threatening to kill the respondent, and beating up her son and abusing him in filthy language would amount to nuisance and annoyance and be a ground for eviction.
Damaging the collapsible gate and putting up a concrete elevation of the floor would amount to doing acts contrary to the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act.
The Bench granted the tenant two months to vacate.
All observations of judges not binding on lower courts: SC
All observations of judges not binding on lower courts: SC 20 Dec 2007, 1916 hrs IST,PTI
The Supreme Court has ruled that neither everything that a judge says constitutes a precedent, nor does the observation of a superior court has a binding effect on the subordinate judiciary. Reliance by courts on an earlier decision without looking into the factual background of the case before it is not permissible, a bench of Justices Arijit Pasayat and P Sathasivam observed. The ruling comes at a time when there is considerable confusion as to whether courts can entertain PILs following the recent observations by a two-judge bench of the apex court criticising the judiciary for its "over-reach" in the executive and legislative domain. "The only thing in a judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi (general rule binding on lower courts)," the apex court said. The apex court passed the ruling while quashing a Karnataka High Court judgement in which it had ruled that ownership of some trees in forests was vested with their "owners" and not the state government. The High Court decided the issue in favour of private individuals by relying upon certain observations in another case, following which the State moved the apex court.
The Supreme Court has ruled that neither everything that a judge says constitutes a precedent, nor does the observation of a superior court has a binding effect on the subordinate judiciary. Reliance by courts on an earlier decision without looking into the factual background of the case before it is not permissible, a bench of Justices Arijit Pasayat and P Sathasivam observed. The ruling comes at a time when there is considerable confusion as to whether courts can entertain PILs following the recent observations by a two-judge bench of the apex court criticising the judiciary for its "over-reach" in the executive and legislative domain. "The only thing in a judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi (general rule binding on lower courts)," the apex court said. The apex court passed the ruling while quashing a Karnataka High Court judgement in which it had ruled that ownership of some trees in forests was vested with their "owners" and not the state government. The High Court decided the issue in favour of private individuals by relying upon certain observations in another case, following which the State moved the apex court.
Divorce tougher than getting married
Divorce tougher than getting married21 Dec 2007, 0250 hrs IST,Swati Deshpande,TNN
She is 27 years old, he 29. They lead separate lives, have separate sets of friends and interests that don’t match. So, what’s the catch? It’s only their third month of marriage and, although both want out, the law is coming in their way. A trip to their lawyer revealed they could not even approach the court with a joint petition till they had a year of separation to show. And then they would have to wait six more months before the divorce decree would be passed to make them legally free to move on. Kranti Sathe, family court lawyer in Mumbai, says young married couples are increasingly questioning the need for a year’s separation before they can file a mutual-consent divorce petition. "Why do I have to wait that long?’ is a constant query I face," she says. The Hindu Marriage Act, which governs marriages between Hindus, and the Special Marriage Act - a secular piece of legislation to solemnise both inter- and same-faith marriages - allow divorce by mutual consent. But the fine print says there should be at least a year of separation before the divorce process can be kicked off in courts. The Indian Divorce Act, dealing with marriages of Christians, requires two years of separation. With changing times, and a fast-evolving society, is the year’s separation necessary? Legal experts, social and marriage counsellors say it’s time to take a fresh look at divorce laws, especially as six more months are required for the court to pass the final order. So 18 months have to pass, at the very least, before a decision to end the marriage mutually can have legal sanction. Sathe, who handles multiple divorce cases, notes: "There is a distinct rise in the number of mutual-consent petitions and the bulk comprises young newly married couples. Most first-time urban marriages take place when both parties are post-25 and, hence, if they decide mutually that their marriage is not working out, we must respect their decision to walk out of it." Her views are echoed by other legal experts. Counsel Mahesh Jethmalani is categorical: "Once two adults go to court and say their marriage has broken down irretrievably, they should be granted a divorce immediately and be spared their misery. The law is no longer practical and, by implementing it, the process is being too technical. We are not talking about child marriages any more." "When a couple are married for more than a couple of years before they decide on a divorce, they easily state they have been living separately for a year even though they may have been sharing the same house and bed," a family court lawyer says. The law abroad permits the couple to live in the same household but they have to show they ate and slept separately. In India, though the law is not very specific, the Supreme Court has laid down that the couple could be considered to be residing separately even if they are staying in the same household. The other hitch is that the law requires both spouses to be present at the time of filing the joint petition and then meet the marriage counsellor in the court; they also have to be present when the decree is passed. Some judges of the family court in Bandra also come to the aid at times, waiving away the six-month wait.But this is done more when a contested petition or a petition for child custody, pending for years, has been converted midway into a consensual decision to split. The long wait in a contested plea is well-known.
She is 27 years old, he 29. They lead separate lives, have separate sets of friends and interests that don’t match. So, what’s the catch? It’s only their third month of marriage and, although both want out, the law is coming in their way. A trip to their lawyer revealed they could not even approach the court with a joint petition till they had a year of separation to show. And then they would have to wait six more months before the divorce decree would be passed to make them legally free to move on. Kranti Sathe, family court lawyer in Mumbai, says young married couples are increasingly questioning the need for a year’s separation before they can file a mutual-consent divorce petition. "Why do I have to wait that long?’ is a constant query I face," she says. The Hindu Marriage Act, which governs marriages between Hindus, and the Special Marriage Act - a secular piece of legislation to solemnise both inter- and same-faith marriages - allow divorce by mutual consent. But the fine print says there should be at least a year of separation before the divorce process can be kicked off in courts. The Indian Divorce Act, dealing with marriages of Christians, requires two years of separation. With changing times, and a fast-evolving society, is the year’s separation necessary? Legal experts, social and marriage counsellors say it’s time to take a fresh look at divorce laws, especially as six more months are required for the court to pass the final order. So 18 months have to pass, at the very least, before a decision to end the marriage mutually can have legal sanction. Sathe, who handles multiple divorce cases, notes: "There is a distinct rise in the number of mutual-consent petitions and the bulk comprises young newly married couples. Most first-time urban marriages take place when both parties are post-25 and, hence, if they decide mutually that their marriage is not working out, we must respect their decision to walk out of it." Her views are echoed by other legal experts. Counsel Mahesh Jethmalani is categorical: "Once two adults go to court and say their marriage has broken down irretrievably, they should be granted a divorce immediately and be spared their misery. The law is no longer practical and, by implementing it, the process is being too technical. We are not talking about child marriages any more." "When a couple are married for more than a couple of years before they decide on a divorce, they easily state they have been living separately for a year even though they may have been sharing the same house and bed," a family court lawyer says. The law abroad permits the couple to live in the same household but they have to show they ate and slept separately. In India, though the law is not very specific, the Supreme Court has laid down that the couple could be considered to be residing separately even if they are staying in the same household. The other hitch is that the law requires both spouses to be present at the time of filing the joint petition and then meet the marriage counsellor in the court; they also have to be present when the decree is passed. Some judges of the family court in Bandra also come to the aid at times, waiving away the six-month wait.But this is done more when a contested petition or a petition for child custody, pending for years, has been converted midway into a consensual decision to split. The long wait in a contested plea is well-known.
HC stays stiff fine on airline
HC stays stiff fine on airline21 Dec 2007, 0308 hrs IST,TNN
NEW DELHI: Keeping with the trend of orders by the State Consumer Commission being stayed due to its jurisdiction being challenged, Delhi High Court on Thursday stayed a consumer commission order against GoAir airline. The commission had ordered the firm which operates the no-frills airline GoAir to pay Rs 15,000 to each passenger of a flight that was cancelled due to a technical snag. The order had come on the petition of one affected consumer who claimed the cancellation cost him harassment and mental agony. However, justice Pradeep Nandrajog stayed the order on a petition filed by GoAirlines challenging the commission’s jurisdiction. HC also issued notice to Yogesh Kumar, on whose petition the commission had passed its order and directed him to respond by April next year. Senior advocate Rajiv Nayyar, appearing for the airline, contended that state commission has no power to proceed in such a sweeping fashion under section 14 (1)(hb) of the Consumer Protection Act 1986. Even if such a power existed, the commission could not have decided to extend the benefit of its order to all other passengers of the flight without giving the airline an opportunity to defend itself, the advocate argued. Criticising the commission further, Nayyar contended the commission failed to take into account that the consumer Yogesh Kumar had failed to provide his contact number as required during the booking of the flight. The petitioner also argued that the commission completely ignored the terms and conditions which had been accepted by Kumar before booking the ticket. On November 12, the commission had passed the order in connection with a compensation application filed by Kumar, passenger of the cancelled flight. Apart from awarding relief to the complainant, the commission went on to extend the benefit of its order to all other passengers of the flight who couldn’t travel due to cancellation of flight but who had not approached the commission for relief. Kumar had awarded a compensation of Rs 17,000 by district forum, which was challenged in the commission by the airline which maintained that since Kumar had bought the ticket from an agent, who was duly informed about the cancellation, no liability could be imputed on it.
NEW DELHI: Keeping with the trend of orders by the State Consumer Commission being stayed due to its jurisdiction being challenged, Delhi High Court on Thursday stayed a consumer commission order against GoAir airline. The commission had ordered the firm which operates the no-frills airline GoAir to pay Rs 15,000 to each passenger of a flight that was cancelled due to a technical snag. The order had come on the petition of one affected consumer who claimed the cancellation cost him harassment and mental agony. However, justice Pradeep Nandrajog stayed the order on a petition filed by GoAirlines challenging the commission’s jurisdiction. HC also issued notice to Yogesh Kumar, on whose petition the commission had passed its order and directed him to respond by April next year. Senior advocate Rajiv Nayyar, appearing for the airline, contended that state commission has no power to proceed in such a sweeping fashion under section 14 (1)(hb) of the Consumer Protection Act 1986. Even if such a power existed, the commission could not have decided to extend the benefit of its order to all other passengers of the flight without giving the airline an opportunity to defend itself, the advocate argued. Criticising the commission further, Nayyar contended the commission failed to take into account that the consumer Yogesh Kumar had failed to provide his contact number as required during the booking of the flight. The petitioner also argued that the commission completely ignored the terms and conditions which had been accepted by Kumar before booking the ticket. On November 12, the commission had passed the order in connection with a compensation application filed by Kumar, passenger of the cancelled flight. Apart from awarding relief to the complainant, the commission went on to extend the benefit of its order to all other passengers of the flight who couldn’t travel due to cancellation of flight but who had not approached the commission for relief. Kumar had awarded a compensation of Rs 17,000 by district forum, which was challenged in the commission by the airline which maintained that since Kumar had bought the ticket from an agent, who was duly informed about the cancellation, no liability could be imputed on it.
Convicts on death row move Supreme Court
Convicts on death row move Supreme Court
They claim that lower courts have convicted them with a prejudiced attitude
3 girl students died when their bus was torched
High Court had confirmed the death sentence
New Delhi: Three persons said to be belonging to the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, sentenced to death in the ‘Dharmapuri bus burning case’ on Thursday moved the Supreme Court seeking stay of the death sentence imposed on them.
The case relates to the death of three girl students — Kokilavani, Gayathri and Hemalatha — of Tamil Nadu Agricultural University, Coimbatore, when the bus in which they were travelling along with 44 other students and two teachers was torched on February 2, 2000.
On February 16, 2007, a trial court in Salem had awarded death sentence to three accused — Nedunchezhian, Ravindran and C. Muniappan — and awarded sentences of varying periods to 25 others.
The trial court had said that the sentences would run consecutively.
On appeal, the Madras High Court on December 6 confirmed the death sentence and the sentence of imprisonment imposed on others but modified it to the extent that it would run concurrently. The present appeals are directed against this judgment.
In their appeals, the three convicts assailed the High court judgment confirming the capital punishment in a case of a non-gruesome murder, which even as per the prosecution case fell under the exception of grave and sudden provocation in the spur of the moment. They said that the lower courts with a prejudiced attitude and being pressured by the existence of heavy media influence and exposure convicted them under Section 302 IPC (murder) and awarded the death penalty without appreciating the fact that the death of the deceased was a result of mob violence.
They claim that lower courts have convicted them with a prejudiced attitude
3 girl students died when their bus was torched
High Court had confirmed the death sentence
New Delhi: Three persons said to be belonging to the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, sentenced to death in the ‘Dharmapuri bus burning case’ on Thursday moved the Supreme Court seeking stay of the death sentence imposed on them.
The case relates to the death of three girl students — Kokilavani, Gayathri and Hemalatha — of Tamil Nadu Agricultural University, Coimbatore, when the bus in which they were travelling along with 44 other students and two teachers was torched on February 2, 2000.
On February 16, 2007, a trial court in Salem had awarded death sentence to three accused — Nedunchezhian, Ravindran and C. Muniappan — and awarded sentences of varying periods to 25 others.
The trial court had said that the sentences would run consecutively.
On appeal, the Madras High Court on December 6 confirmed the death sentence and the sentence of imprisonment imposed on others but modified it to the extent that it would run concurrently. The present appeals are directed against this judgment.
In their appeals, the three convicts assailed the High court judgment confirming the capital punishment in a case of a non-gruesome murder, which even as per the prosecution case fell under the exception of grave and sudden provocation in the spur of the moment. They said that the lower courts with a prejudiced attitude and being pressured by the existence of heavy media influence and exposure convicted them under Section 302 IPC (murder) and awarded the death penalty without appreciating the fact that the death of the deceased was a result of mob violence.
Court serves notice to Union Ministries on sex change issue
Court serves notice to Union Ministries on sex change issue
Follows PIL by social activist
Cases of two women, who faced punishment, cited
NEW DELHI: The Delhi High Court has issued notices to the Union Home and Health and Child Welfare Ministries and the Delhi Government on public interest litigation seeking guidelines for treating those who undergo natural sex change midway through their lives as a separate category with all the benefits that are available to other members of society.
A Division Bench of the Court comprising Justice T.S. Thakur and Justice Veena Birbal directed them to file their replies by May 5 next year. The petitioner, social activist Rahul Verma, cited in his petition two instances in which two women were found to have undergone gender change and were punished for no fault of theirs.
He submitted that in the first instance, the Central Industrial Security Force had dismissed a woman employee during her training period when she was found to have undergone gender transformation. She had been recruited under the women’s category. In the second instance, Tamil Nadu-based athlete Santhi Soundarajan, who had won the silver medal at the Doha Asian Games last year in the 800 metres race, was divested of the medal when she was found to have developed male features, the petitioner submitted.
The Railways had also refused to give employment to her as she failed the gender test, the petition said. The petitioner submitted that such persons should not be discriminated against as they underwent gender change due to forces beyond their control. He said the Government should also provide free medical treatment to such persons.
Follows PIL by social activist
Cases of two women, who faced punishment, cited
NEW DELHI: The Delhi High Court has issued notices to the Union Home and Health and Child Welfare Ministries and the Delhi Government on public interest litigation seeking guidelines for treating those who undergo natural sex change midway through their lives as a separate category with all the benefits that are available to other members of society.
A Division Bench of the Court comprising Justice T.S. Thakur and Justice Veena Birbal directed them to file their replies by May 5 next year. The petitioner, social activist Rahul Verma, cited in his petition two instances in which two women were found to have undergone gender change and were punished for no fault of theirs.
He submitted that in the first instance, the Central Industrial Security Force had dismissed a woman employee during her training period when she was found to have undergone gender transformation. She had been recruited under the women’s category. In the second instance, Tamil Nadu-based athlete Santhi Soundarajan, who had won the silver medal at the Doha Asian Games last year in the 800 metres race, was divested of the medal when she was found to have developed male features, the petitioner submitted.
The Railways had also refused to give employment to her as she failed the gender test, the petition said. The petitioner submitted that such persons should not be discriminated against as they underwent gender change due to forces beyond their control. He said the Government should also provide free medical treatment to such persons.
Some allies stalling Women’s Bill, alleges Margaret Alva
Some allies stalling Women’s Bill, alleges Margaret Alva
One option is reducing percentage to 20 in Parliament and 25 in Assemblies
Some understanding should be reached now to introduce Bill in budget session: Brinda
NEW DELHI: Blaming some UPA coalition partners for stalling the Women’s Reservation Bill, senior Congress leader Margaret Alva has called for a “flexible approach” to arrive at consensus. One option was reducing the percentage of reservation to 20 in Parliament and 25 in the State Assemblies while the gap could be filled from the general quota — on which all parties had more or less agreed — or introducing 33 per cent reservation only in the Assemblies now and subsequently in Parliament. Introducing reservation in the Assemblies would be easier, Ms. Alva said speaking at an interactive meeting organised by the National Commission for Women here.
Clarifying that these were personal opinions and not of her party or government suggestions, she said that in the present coalition set-up, consensus on 33 per cent reservation appeared unlikely. At least two-thirds of the political leaders, including Cabinet Ministers, would not allow the Cabinet to clear the Bill for being tabled in Parliament. “The Prime Minister and the Congress president are holding extensive discussions with leaders of the political parties but consensus seems elusive.” After the political parties, opposing the Bill in the original form, accepted the proposal for reducing the percentage, she made this suggestion to women’s groups, Ms. Alva said. “I think we have to be more flexible and see what works in the existing system.”
While this was greeted with silence initially, the women’s groups present at the meeting wanted a formal proposal from the government so that it could be discussed with grass roots workers. The meeting, where only two women MPs were present, was represented mostly by women’s groups and individuals working on the field, who outright rejected a proposal of rotation of seats and the concept of reservation within reservation.
Brinda Karat of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) said she had spoken to Rashtriya Janata Dal chief Lalu Prasad thrice during the winter session and asked him to commit his support to reservation before finalising on the percentage, but failed to extract a commitment.
Bihar Chief Minister Nitish Kumar had told Ms. Karat that he would not oppose if the parties arrived at consensus, while Mulayam Singh (SP) rejected the concept of rotation of seats.
One option is reducing percentage to 20 in Parliament and 25 in Assemblies
Some understanding should be reached now to introduce Bill in budget session: Brinda
NEW DELHI: Blaming some UPA coalition partners for stalling the Women’s Reservation Bill, senior Congress leader Margaret Alva has called for a “flexible approach” to arrive at consensus. One option was reducing the percentage of reservation to 20 in Parliament and 25 in the State Assemblies while the gap could be filled from the general quota — on which all parties had more or less agreed — or introducing 33 per cent reservation only in the Assemblies now and subsequently in Parliament. Introducing reservation in the Assemblies would be easier, Ms. Alva said speaking at an interactive meeting organised by the National Commission for Women here.
Clarifying that these were personal opinions and not of her party or government suggestions, she said that in the present coalition set-up, consensus on 33 per cent reservation appeared unlikely. At least two-thirds of the political leaders, including Cabinet Ministers, would not allow the Cabinet to clear the Bill for being tabled in Parliament. “The Prime Minister and the Congress president are holding extensive discussions with leaders of the political parties but consensus seems elusive.” After the political parties, opposing the Bill in the original form, accepted the proposal for reducing the percentage, she made this suggestion to women’s groups, Ms. Alva said. “I think we have to be more flexible and see what works in the existing system.”
While this was greeted with silence initially, the women’s groups present at the meeting wanted a formal proposal from the government so that it could be discussed with grass roots workers. The meeting, where only two women MPs were present, was represented mostly by women’s groups and individuals working on the field, who outright rejected a proposal of rotation of seats and the concept of reservation within reservation.
Brinda Karat of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) said she had spoken to Rashtriya Janata Dal chief Lalu Prasad thrice during the winter session and asked him to commit his support to reservation before finalising on the percentage, but failed to extract a commitment.
Bihar Chief Minister Nitish Kumar had told Ms. Karat that he would not oppose if the parties arrived at consensus, while Mulayam Singh (SP) rejected the concept of rotation of seats.
Beware private malice behind veil of public interest: court
Beware private malice behind veil of public interest: court
High Courts cautioned against entertaining PIL recklessly
PIL should be used with great care, circumspection
It should not be used for suspicious products of mischief
Even as a three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court recently decided to lay down guidelines for entertaining public interest litigation petitions, a two-judge Bench has cautioned the High Courts against entertaining such pleas recklessly.
The Bench, comprising Justices Arijit Pasayat and P. Sathasivam, pointed out that the court had already laid down basic parameters for entertaining PIL pleas. But the High Courts continued to entertain them, ignoring the parameters. Wastage of time
Writing the judgment, Mr. Justice Pasayat said:
“It is depressing to note that on account of such trumpery proceedings initiated before the courts, innumerable days are wasted, which otherwise could have been spent for disposal of cases of genuine litigants.
“We spare no effort in fostering and developing the laudable concept of PIL and extending our long arm of sympathy to the poor, the ignorant, the oppressed and the needy, whose fundamental rights are infringed and violated and whose grievances go unnoticed, un-represented and unheard.”
The Bench said: “While genuine litigants with legitimate grievances are standing in a long queue for years with the fond hope of getting into the courts and having their grievances redressed, the busybodies, meddlesome interlopers, wayfarers or officious interveners having absolutely no public interest except for personal gain or private profit either of themselves or as a proxy of others break the queue muffling their faces by wearing the mask of PIL and get into the courts by filing vexatious and frivolous petitions and thus criminally waste the valuable time of the courts.”
As a result of PIL, “the queue standing outside the doors of the courts never moves, which creates frustration in the minds of the genuine litigants and resultantly they lose faith in the administration of our judicial system.”
The Bench said PIL was a weapon which should be used with great care and circumspection, and the judiciary had to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity monger was not lurking.
“PIL is to be used as an effective weapon in the armoury of law for delivering social justice to the citizens. The attractive brand name of PIL should not be used for suspicious products of mischief.”“Prevent crafty invasions”
The Bench said: “Courts must do justice by promotion of good faith and prevent law from crafty invasions. Courts must maintain the social balance by interfering where necessary for the sake of justice and refuse to interfere where it is against the social interest and public good. No litigant has a right to unlimited draught on the court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner he wishes. Easy access to justice should not be misused as a licence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions.”
In the instant case, acting on a PIL petition from Prem Chandra Mishra and others on land allotment, the Patna High Court passed an order giving certain directions. In a special leave petition, Holicow Pictures Pvt. Ltd challenged this order. The apex court Bench set it aside and remitted the matter back to the High Court for fresh consideration.
High Courts cautioned against entertaining PIL recklessly
PIL should be used with great care, circumspection
It should not be used for suspicious products of mischief
Even as a three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court recently decided to lay down guidelines for entertaining public interest litigation petitions, a two-judge Bench has cautioned the High Courts against entertaining such pleas recklessly.
The Bench, comprising Justices Arijit Pasayat and P. Sathasivam, pointed out that the court had already laid down basic parameters for entertaining PIL pleas. But the High Courts continued to entertain them, ignoring the parameters. Wastage of time
Writing the judgment, Mr. Justice Pasayat said:
“It is depressing to note that on account of such trumpery proceedings initiated before the courts, innumerable days are wasted, which otherwise could have been spent for disposal of cases of genuine litigants.
“We spare no effort in fostering and developing the laudable concept of PIL and extending our long arm of sympathy to the poor, the ignorant, the oppressed and the needy, whose fundamental rights are infringed and violated and whose grievances go unnoticed, un-represented and unheard.”
The Bench said: “While genuine litigants with legitimate grievances are standing in a long queue for years with the fond hope of getting into the courts and having their grievances redressed, the busybodies, meddlesome interlopers, wayfarers or officious interveners having absolutely no public interest except for personal gain or private profit either of themselves or as a proxy of others break the queue muffling their faces by wearing the mask of PIL and get into the courts by filing vexatious and frivolous petitions and thus criminally waste the valuable time of the courts.”
As a result of PIL, “the queue standing outside the doors of the courts never moves, which creates frustration in the minds of the genuine litigants and resultantly they lose faith in the administration of our judicial system.”
The Bench said PIL was a weapon which should be used with great care and circumspection, and the judiciary had to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity monger was not lurking.
“PIL is to be used as an effective weapon in the armoury of law for delivering social justice to the citizens. The attractive brand name of PIL should not be used for suspicious products of mischief.”“Prevent crafty invasions”
The Bench said: “Courts must do justice by promotion of good faith and prevent law from crafty invasions. Courts must maintain the social balance by interfering where necessary for the sake of justice and refuse to interfere where it is against the social interest and public good. No litigant has a right to unlimited draught on the court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner he wishes. Easy access to justice should not be misused as a licence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions.”
In the instant case, acting on a PIL petition from Prem Chandra Mishra and others on land allotment, the Patna High Court passed an order giving certain directions. In a special leave petition, Holicow Pictures Pvt. Ltd challenged this order. The apex court Bench set it aside and remitted the matter back to the High Court for fresh consideration.
Thursday, December 20, 2007
Reprieve for Sania in ad shoot case
Reprieve for Sania in ad shoot case20 Dec 2007,
HYDERABAD: Mecca Masjid officials have asked the police to withdraw the case against tennis star Sania Mirza. The police is however yet to take a decision on withdrawal of the case. An ad shoot in the historic mosque had provoked angry reactions from locals, some clerics and Majlis Ittehadul Muslimeen (MIM) activists. The protestors said the tennis player had hurt religious sentiments by shooting in the mosque "without permission." Earlier, the Minority Welfare Department had filed a complaint with the police that Mirza, along with the agency's crew had entered the mosque on December 10 without prior permission from the authorities. In e-mail to Hyderabad Police Commissioner, Mirza apologised for shooting a commercial at the 17th century mosque. She also apologised to the Imam of the mosque.
HYDERABAD: Mecca Masjid officials have asked the police to withdraw the case against tennis star Sania Mirza. The police is however yet to take a decision on withdrawal of the case. An ad shoot in the historic mosque had provoked angry reactions from locals, some clerics and Majlis Ittehadul Muslimeen (MIM) activists. The protestors said the tennis player had hurt religious sentiments by shooting in the mosque "without permission." Earlier, the Minority Welfare Department had filed a complaint with the police that Mirza, along with the agency's crew had entered the mosque on December 10 without prior permission from the authorities. In e-mail to Hyderabad Police Commissioner, Mirza apologised for shooting a commercial at the 17th century mosque. She also apologised to the Imam of the mosque.
HC judges opt for bus over car fleet
HC judges opt for bus over car fleet
20 Dec 2007, 0113 hrs IST,Prafulla Marpakwar,TNN
MUMBAI: The red-beacon-flashing official car is the Indian VVIP's preferred mode of travel. But judges of the high court will today pass it up for a more plebeian form of transport-a bus. The judges, who are travelling to Uttan in Thane district for the foundation stone-laying ceremony of a law academy, responded with enthusiasm to the idea which was reportedly mooted by a senior traffic official. While CJI K G Balakrishnan and Bombay HC CJ Swatantra Kumar will travel according to protocol norms, the others-at least 50 HC judges-will board buses for Uttan from the high court. "Instead of 50 cars, they will travel in five to six buses," said a senior official who believes that this act will set a new example for VVIPs who travel only by car. The issue of a large VVIP convoy was first raised last year when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was in Mumbai to review the progress of the government's aid package for Vidarbha farmers. Traffic on the entire route from the airport to Raj Bhavan turned chaotic for several hours due to the PM's convoy of 55 vehicles as against the prescribed norm of 17. The state government had taken up the issue of the large number of vehicles in the convoys of the President and Prime Minister with the Centre, but there was no response. "We feel that even for security reasons, there should be fewer cars in the convoy. Besides, in a city like Mumbai it's not advisable to halt traffic either for the President or the PM for a long time," the official added.
20 Dec 2007, 0113 hrs IST,Prafulla Marpakwar,TNN
MUMBAI: The red-beacon-flashing official car is the Indian VVIP's preferred mode of travel. But judges of the high court will today pass it up for a more plebeian form of transport-a bus. The judges, who are travelling to Uttan in Thane district for the foundation stone-laying ceremony of a law academy, responded with enthusiasm to the idea which was reportedly mooted by a senior traffic official. While CJI K G Balakrishnan and Bombay HC CJ Swatantra Kumar will travel according to protocol norms, the others-at least 50 HC judges-will board buses for Uttan from the high court. "Instead of 50 cars, they will travel in five to six buses," said a senior official who believes that this act will set a new example for VVIPs who travel only by car. The issue of a large VVIP convoy was first raised last year when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was in Mumbai to review the progress of the government's aid package for Vidarbha farmers. Traffic on the entire route from the airport to Raj Bhavan turned chaotic for several hours due to the PM's convoy of 55 vehicles as against the prescribed norm of 17. The state government had taken up the issue of the large number of vehicles in the convoys of the President and Prime Minister with the Centre, but there was no response. "We feel that even for security reasons, there should be fewer cars in the convoy. Besides, in a city like Mumbai it's not advisable to halt traffic either for the President or the PM for a long time," the official added.
Take care of confiscated vehicles: HC
Take care of confiscated vehicles: HC18 Dec 2007, 0153 hrs IST,TNN
BANGALORE: The High Court on Monday observed that guidelines need to be evolved to prevent confiscated vehicles from becoming obsolete and unusable. "We've found these vehicles parked for months and years together in front of police stations. They are battered by the elements when the confiscation proceedings are being held. This problem can be solved by issuing guidelines - akin to taking bank guarantee. We'll consider this aspect when we pass orders in these cases," a division Bench headed by Chief Justice Cyriac Joseph remarked. It refused the petitioners' plea to release four JCBs seized by the Lok Ayukta police for indulging in illegal mining in Chitradurga.
The Bench directed the Holalkere JMFC to dispose of the confiscation proceedings within six weeks. The court has summoned the owners for the hearing on December 24. Advocate-general B V Acharya, representing the Lok Ayukta, said the JCBs were seized with 18,500 tonnes of ore - valued at Rs 2 crore - on June 13, 2007.
Delhi HC receives threat from Al-Qaida
Delhi HC receives threat from Al-Qaida20 Dec 2007, 1312 hrs IST,PTI
NEW DELHI: The Delhi High Court on Thursday said it had received a threatening e-mail from terrorist outfit Al-Qaida, a few days after the serial blasts in Uttar Pradesh district courts last month. According to court sources, the e-mail was forwarded to the Home Ministry following which the security in the High Court was beefed up. Refusing to disclose the contents of the e-mail, the sources said it had issued threats to the High Court, Parliament and the Taj Mahal in Agra. Denying the receipt of any fresh threat mail, they said a meeting of the Delhi Police officers as well as court officials has been convened to discuss the issue.
NEW DELHI: The Delhi High Court on Thursday said it had received a threatening e-mail from terrorist outfit Al-Qaida, a few days after the serial blasts in Uttar Pradesh district courts last month. According to court sources, the e-mail was forwarded to the Home Ministry following which the security in the High Court was beefed up. Refusing to disclose the contents of the e-mail, the sources said it had issued threats to the High Court, Parliament and the Taj Mahal in Agra. Denying the receipt of any fresh threat mail, they said a meeting of the Delhi Police officers as well as court officials has been convened to discuss the issue.
‘Rape victims cannot be treated differently’
‘Rape victims cannot be treated differently’
High Court strikes down CM’s discretion in matters of relief Chief Minister’s Relief Fund Rules empower the CM to award monetary relief to unlimited extent Petitioner says he tried to raise the issue in Assembly but Raje did not pay heed to it
JAIPUR: In a landmark judgment, the Rajasthan High Court has ruled against discrimination in the award of monetary relief to minor girls subjected to rape while striking down the Chief Minister’s discretion in such matters under the Relief Fund.
A Division Bench of the Court handed down the ruling while allowing a public interest writ petition moved by Congress MLA Sanyam Lodha seeking disbursement of equal monetary assistance to all rape victims irrespective of their age.
The Chief Minister’s Relief Fund Rules, 1999, empower the CM to award monetary relief to an unlimited extent on his or her own accord to rape victims and flood and drought victims and for development of hospitals, medical exigencies, children’s welfare and overall development of the State.
The Bench, comprising Justice Shiv Kumar Sharma and Justice M.C. Sharma, judicially substituted the phrase “unlimited extent” in Rule 5 of the Chief Minister’s Relief Fund Rules with “equally and without discrimination”, thereby curtailing the Chief Minister’s powers to award any amount of relief arbitrarily to any victim covered by the Fund.CM’s power
Mr. Lodha, citing the case of an adult rape victim who was given an exorbitant relief of Rs.5 lakh, contended that the minor rape victims should be treated on an equal footing and paid the same amount of assistance. He said the Chief Minister’s power to determine low monetary relief to minor girls in comparison with the adult rape victims was unjustifiable.
The petitioner said he had tried to raise the issue on the floor of the Assembly but Chief Minister Vasundhara Raje did not pay heed to it. Ms. Raje never tried to reconsider the wide discretion given to her in such matters under the Relief Fund Rules, he added.
The High Court, while observing that it could not “shut its eyes towards the discriminatory treatment meted out to minor girls subjected to rape”, expressed surprise over the MLA approaching the Court to invoke its extraordinary writ jurisdiction when the debate on “Lakshman Rekha” (boundaries) among the judiciary, the legislature and the executive was going on.Equal treatment
“In our opinion, all the victims of rape are alike and are required to be treated equally. They cannot be treated differently even on the basis of different circumstances of the case,” said the Bench, adding that all rape victims should be the same for the Chief Minister, regardless of their age.
“When no distinction is made in the Indian Penal Code between the victims of rape, why are they being discriminated against in the grant of relief?” asked the Court while directing an alteration in the impugned phrase in the Relief Fund Rules.
High Court strikes down CM’s discretion in matters of relief Chief Minister’s Relief Fund Rules empower the CM to award monetary relief to unlimited extent Petitioner says he tried to raise the issue in Assembly but Raje did not pay heed to it
JAIPUR: In a landmark judgment, the Rajasthan High Court has ruled against discrimination in the award of monetary relief to minor girls subjected to rape while striking down the Chief Minister’s discretion in such matters under the Relief Fund.
A Division Bench of the Court handed down the ruling while allowing a public interest writ petition moved by Congress MLA Sanyam Lodha seeking disbursement of equal monetary assistance to all rape victims irrespective of their age.
The Chief Minister’s Relief Fund Rules, 1999, empower the CM to award monetary relief to an unlimited extent on his or her own accord to rape victims and flood and drought victims and for development of hospitals, medical exigencies, children’s welfare and overall development of the State.
The Bench, comprising Justice Shiv Kumar Sharma and Justice M.C. Sharma, judicially substituted the phrase “unlimited extent” in Rule 5 of the Chief Minister’s Relief Fund Rules with “equally and without discrimination”, thereby curtailing the Chief Minister’s powers to award any amount of relief arbitrarily to any victim covered by the Fund.CM’s power
Mr. Lodha, citing the case of an adult rape victim who was given an exorbitant relief of Rs.5 lakh, contended that the minor rape victims should be treated on an equal footing and paid the same amount of assistance. He said the Chief Minister’s power to determine low monetary relief to minor girls in comparison with the adult rape victims was unjustifiable.
The petitioner said he had tried to raise the issue on the floor of the Assembly but Chief Minister Vasundhara Raje did not pay heed to it. Ms. Raje never tried to reconsider the wide discretion given to her in such matters under the Relief Fund Rules, he added.
The High Court, while observing that it could not “shut its eyes towards the discriminatory treatment meted out to minor girls subjected to rape”, expressed surprise over the MLA approaching the Court to invoke its extraordinary writ jurisdiction when the debate on “Lakshman Rekha” (boundaries) among the judiciary, the legislature and the executive was going on.Equal treatment
“In our opinion, all the victims of rape are alike and are required to be treated equally. They cannot be treated differently even on the basis of different circumstances of the case,” said the Bench, adding that all rape victims should be the same for the Chief Minister, regardless of their age.
“When no distinction is made in the Indian Penal Code between the victims of rape, why are they being discriminated against in the grant of relief?” asked the Court while directing an alteration in the impugned phrase in the Relief Fund Rules.
Sobhraj case to be reopened
Sobhraj case to be reopened
KATHMANDU: Nepal’s Supreme Court has ordered the court administration to reopen the fake passport case against Charles Sobharaj, who is already facing murder charges. A bench deferred its final verdict on the murder cases till the hearing on the fake passport case, in which Sobharaj was already acquitted by the lower court.
It was yet another letdown for the “bikini killer,” who was expecting an acquittal on the murder charges on Wednesday, when the justices Anup Raj Sharma and Tap Bahadur Magar delivered the order.
Fodder scam: jail, fines for three convicts
Fodder scam: jail, fines for three convicts
Ranchi: A CBI court on Wednesday slapped fines of Rs. 1 crore each on three persons convicted in the fodder scam cases. It also sentenced them and 35 others to a six-year jail term. Six women accused were sentenced to five years rigorous imprisonment.
CBI special judge B.K. Sahay directed the former regional director of Animal Husbandary Department, Ranchi region, Junul Bhengraj, the former AHD regional director, Kirti Narayan Jha, and the ex-assistant director (Planning), Krishna Mohan Prasad, to pay Rs. 1 crore each as fine.
The case pertains to the fraudulent withdrawal of Rs. 6.29 crore from the Chaibasa treasury in the 1990s.
Ranchi: A CBI court on Wednesday slapped fines of Rs. 1 crore each on three persons convicted in the fodder scam cases. It also sentenced them and 35 others to a six-year jail term. Six women accused were sentenced to five years rigorous imprisonment.
CBI special judge B.K. Sahay directed the former regional director of Animal Husbandary Department, Ranchi region, Junul Bhengraj, the former AHD regional director, Kirti Narayan Jha, and the ex-assistant director (Planning), Krishna Mohan Prasad, to pay Rs. 1 crore each as fine.
The case pertains to the fraudulent withdrawal of Rs. 6.29 crore from the Chaibasa treasury in the 1990s.
Wednesday, December 19, 2007
NO NEED TO ALARM - J S VERMA
No Need For Alarm19 Dec 2007, 0001 hrs IST,J S Verma
A few recent incidents have given a fillip to the ongoing debate on the legitimacy of alleged judicial forays into the seemingly exclusive domain of the executive and legislature in the constitutional scheme of separation of powers. The two most significant of these are the debate on the issue in the last session of Parliament seeking a curb on 'judicial activism' along with enforcement of judicial accountability and now a two-judge bench order of the Supreme Court on December 6. The bench comprising justices A K Mathur and M Katju advocated judicial activism confined to genuine PILs and called for judicial restraint to prevent erosion of the independence of judiciary by the threatened exercise of political power.
The reported observation of the chief justice of India made later, while entertaining a PIL, to refer the issue for consideration by a larger bench to frame guidelines and prescribe norms for PILs is a welcome sequel. It is a step essential for consistency and legitimacy of judicial intervention in PILs. It is time this constitutional issue is resolved by a decision of the constitution bench assisted by the leaders of the Bar. Media reports contain many reactions to the two-judge bench decision. Most of them welcome the call for judicial restraint by the judiciary itself, and the editorials in many national dailies are laudatory. However, some contrary reactions call the decision a retrograde step inconsistent with the settled practice in favour of PILs. My comments are based on the text of the order. Para 15 of the order states the principle or ratio of the decision; paras 17 to 40 are an elaboration of that principle and a summary of the conclusion of that discussion. It is settled that the ratio alone, and no other part, of a judgment is binding. To say that this decision unsettles, its ratio must be inconsistent with binding precedents. Is it so? The nub of the decision in para 15 says: "The court cannot direct the creation of posts. Creation and sanction of posts is a prerogative of the executive or legislative authorities and the court cannot arrogate to itself this purely executive or legislative function, and direct creation of posts in any organisation. This court has time and again pointed out that the creation of a post is an executive or legislative function and it involves economic factors. Hence the courts cannot take upon themselves the power of creation of a post". Obviously, this is unexceptional and consistent with binding precedents. The conclusion reached in para 39 of the order after discussing the doctrine of separation of powers, is: "We hasten to add that it is not our opinion that judges should never be 'activist'. Sometimes judicial activism is a useful adjunct to democracy such as in the School Segregation and Human Rights decisions of the US Supreme Court vide Brown vs Board of Education, Miranda vs Arizona, Roe vs Wade etc or the decisions of our own Supreme Court which expanded the scope of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. This, however, should be resorted to only in exceptional circumstances when the situation forcefully demands it in the interest of the nation or the poorer and weaker sections of society but always keeping in mind that ordinarily the task of legislation or administrative decisions is for the legislature and the executive and not for the judiciary". There can be no objection to this conclusion, which does not preclude genuine PILs. It reiterates the caution administered so often by the Supreme Court. The discussion in paras 17 to 38 and 40 of the principle or ratio led to the conclusion in para 39. It mainly advocates judicial restraint quoting Montesquieu's theory of separation of powers from his book, The Spirit of Laws, the oft-quoted caution of Benjamin Cardozo from The Nature of the Judicial Process that "the judge is not a knight errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty and goodness", and some judgments of the US Supreme Court and Supreme Court of India to buttress that view. There is a note of caution that the lack of the needed judicial restraint may provoke threat to the independence of judiciary from politicians, which is reminiscent of US President Roosevelt's attempt to pack the Supreme Court when the New Deal measures were blocked. The current mood in Parliament reflected during the debate on the issue may have prompted these remarks. The interim orders relating to two state assemblies appear to be referred to because of the public criticism that they were encroaching the legislative domain. Maybe, it was unnecessary. But it is neither a part of the ratio nor that of the conclusion to affect the merits of the decision. The judgment cannot be read as shutting out genuine PILs. In fact, it is a forceful plea for genuine PILs advocating judicial restraint to curb the frivolous filed for extraneous reasons, and to prevent any political attempt to erode the independence of judiciary on this pretext. I would welcome introspection by the judiciary to strengthen itself, and to ward off the lurking dangers to its independence on the pretext of curbing illegitimate judicial interventions. It generates a healthy debate on a public issue.
A few recent incidents have given a fillip to the ongoing debate on the legitimacy of alleged judicial forays into the seemingly exclusive domain of the executive and legislature in the constitutional scheme of separation of powers. The two most significant of these are the debate on the issue in the last session of Parliament seeking a curb on 'judicial activism' along with enforcement of judicial accountability and now a two-judge bench order of the Supreme Court on December 6. The bench comprising justices A K Mathur and M Katju advocated judicial activism confined to genuine PILs and called for judicial restraint to prevent erosion of the independence of judiciary by the threatened exercise of political power.
The reported observation of the chief justice of India made later, while entertaining a PIL, to refer the issue for consideration by a larger bench to frame guidelines and prescribe norms for PILs is a welcome sequel. It is a step essential for consistency and legitimacy of judicial intervention in PILs. It is time this constitutional issue is resolved by a decision of the constitution bench assisted by the leaders of the Bar. Media reports contain many reactions to the two-judge bench decision. Most of them welcome the call for judicial restraint by the judiciary itself, and the editorials in many national dailies are laudatory. However, some contrary reactions call the decision a retrograde step inconsistent with the settled practice in favour of PILs. My comments are based on the text of the order. Para 15 of the order states the principle or ratio of the decision; paras 17 to 40 are an elaboration of that principle and a summary of the conclusion of that discussion. It is settled that the ratio alone, and no other part, of a judgment is binding. To say that this decision unsettles, its ratio must be inconsistent with binding precedents. Is it so? The nub of the decision in para 15 says: "The court cannot direct the creation of posts. Creation and sanction of posts is a prerogative of the executive or legislative authorities and the court cannot arrogate to itself this purely executive or legislative function, and direct creation of posts in any organisation. This court has time and again pointed out that the creation of a post is an executive or legislative function and it involves economic factors. Hence the courts cannot take upon themselves the power of creation of a post". Obviously, this is unexceptional and consistent with binding precedents. The conclusion reached in para 39 of the order after discussing the doctrine of separation of powers, is: "We hasten to add that it is not our opinion that judges should never be 'activist'. Sometimes judicial activism is a useful adjunct to democracy such as in the School Segregation and Human Rights decisions of the US Supreme Court vide Brown vs Board of Education, Miranda vs Arizona, Roe vs Wade etc or the decisions of our own Supreme Court which expanded the scope of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. This, however, should be resorted to only in exceptional circumstances when the situation forcefully demands it in the interest of the nation or the poorer and weaker sections of society but always keeping in mind that ordinarily the task of legislation or administrative decisions is for the legislature and the executive and not for the judiciary". There can be no objection to this conclusion, which does not preclude genuine PILs. It reiterates the caution administered so often by the Supreme Court. The discussion in paras 17 to 38 and 40 of the principle or ratio led to the conclusion in para 39. It mainly advocates judicial restraint quoting Montesquieu's theory of separation of powers from his book, The Spirit of Laws, the oft-quoted caution of Benjamin Cardozo from The Nature of the Judicial Process that "the judge is not a knight errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty and goodness", and some judgments of the US Supreme Court and Supreme Court of India to buttress that view. There is a note of caution that the lack of the needed judicial restraint may provoke threat to the independence of judiciary from politicians, which is reminiscent of US President Roosevelt's attempt to pack the Supreme Court when the New Deal measures were blocked. The current mood in Parliament reflected during the debate on the issue may have prompted these remarks. The interim orders relating to two state assemblies appear to be referred to because of the public criticism that they were encroaching the legislative domain. Maybe, it was unnecessary. But it is neither a part of the ratio nor that of the conclusion to affect the merits of the decision. The judgment cannot be read as shutting out genuine PILs. In fact, it is a forceful plea for genuine PILs advocating judicial restraint to curb the frivolous filed for extraneous reasons, and to prevent any political attempt to erode the independence of judiciary on this pretext. I would welcome introspection by the judiciary to strengthen itself, and to ward off the lurking dangers to its independence on the pretext of curbing illegitimate judicial interventions. It generates a healthy debate on a public issue.
Shivani murder case: Sharma casts doubts over police probe
Shivani murder case: Sharma casts doubts over police probe17 Dec 2007, 2025 hrs IST,PTI
Suspended IPS officer and prime accused in Shivani Bhatnagar murder, R K Sharma, on Monday alleged lapses during investigation and accused the police of tampering with the scene of crime. Arguing before Additional Sessions Judge Rajender Kumar Shastri, Sharma's counsel S P Minocha said the police probe into the case was not free of suspicion as many crucial witnesses had come up with contradictory testimonies. Minocha alleged that the police during investigation had tampered with the scene of murder, so as build up a case that suited the prosecution. He claimed that there were material contradictions in the testimonies of various witnesses over the seizure of glasses found placed on a table of Shivani's Navkunj Apartments house, and recovered after her murder on January 23, 1999. The counsel claimed that while household things were alleged left scattered after the commission of the crime, the photographs taken by the police indicated otherwise. Minocha submitted that in light of the material contradictions and lapses in investigation, benefit of doubt should be go given to the accused. He tried to substantiate his claim by referring to some Supreme Court judgements. The arguments which remained inconclusive would continue on Tuesday. Apart from Sharma, the other co-accused in the care include - Pradeep Sharma, Satya Prakash, Sri Bhagwan, Ved Prakash Sharma and Ved alias Kalu.
Suspended IPS officer and prime accused in Shivani Bhatnagar murder, R K Sharma, on Monday alleged lapses during investigation and accused the police of tampering with the scene of crime. Arguing before Additional Sessions Judge Rajender Kumar Shastri, Sharma's counsel S P Minocha said the police probe into the case was not free of suspicion as many crucial witnesses had come up with contradictory testimonies. Minocha alleged that the police during investigation had tampered with the scene of murder, so as build up a case that suited the prosecution. He claimed that there were material contradictions in the testimonies of various witnesses over the seizure of glasses found placed on a table of Shivani's Navkunj Apartments house, and recovered after her murder on January 23, 1999. The counsel claimed that while household things were alleged left scattered after the commission of the crime, the photographs taken by the police indicated otherwise. Minocha submitted that in light of the material contradictions and lapses in investigation, benefit of doubt should be go given to the accused. He tried to substantiate his claim by referring to some Supreme Court judgements. The arguments which remained inconclusive would continue on Tuesday. Apart from Sharma, the other co-accused in the care include - Pradeep Sharma, Satya Prakash, Sri Bhagwan, Ved Prakash Sharma and Ved alias Kalu.
CP shootout case: Two cops challenge their conviction
CP shootout case: Two cops challenge their conviction17 Dec 2007, 2157 hrs IST,PTI
Constables Sumer Singh and Kothari Ram, sentenced to life term in the Connaught Place fake encounter case, on Monday, challenged their conviction in the Delhi High Court. Ten cops, including the two convicts and the then ACP S S Rathi, were sentenced to life imprisonment for killing two innocent Haryana based businessmen - Pradeep Goyal and Jagjit Singh - at Barakhamba Road in New Delhi on March 31, 1997 in a fake encounter. Seeking suspension of sentence, the two constables contended that though they were part of the team that was hunting for the UP-based gangsters, the prosecution did not have any evidence against them and the trial court had failed to appreciate that. The Bench of Justice B N Chaturvedi and Justice G S Sistani would hear their appeal on Wednesday. ACP Rathi and Inspector Anil Kumar have already filed their appeal against their conviction and the Bench has issued notice to CBI and listed the matter in January next year. As per the CBI, the police team which was hunting for UP-based gangster Yaseen and his associate had gunned down Goyal and Singh by "indiscriminately" firing at the instruction of ACP Rathi without any provocation.
Constables Sumer Singh and Kothari Ram, sentenced to life term in the Connaught Place fake encounter case, on Monday, challenged their conviction in the Delhi High Court. Ten cops, including the two convicts and the then ACP S S Rathi, were sentenced to life imprisonment for killing two innocent Haryana based businessmen - Pradeep Goyal and Jagjit Singh - at Barakhamba Road in New Delhi on March 31, 1997 in a fake encounter. Seeking suspension of sentence, the two constables contended that though they were part of the team that was hunting for the UP-based gangsters, the prosecution did not have any evidence against them and the trial court had failed to appreciate that. The Bench of Justice B N Chaturvedi and Justice G S Sistani would hear their appeal on Wednesday. ACP Rathi and Inspector Anil Kumar have already filed their appeal against their conviction and the Bench has issued notice to CBI and listed the matter in January next year. As per the CBI, the police team which was hunting for UP-based gangster Yaseen and his associate had gunned down Goyal and Singh by "indiscriminately" firing at the instruction of ACP Rathi without any provocation.
CP shootout case: HC issues notice to CBI on cop's plea18 Dec 2007, 2101 hrs IST,PTI
The Delhi High Court on Tuesday issued notice to CBI on an appeal filed by two constables sentenced to life term in the Connaught Place fake encounter case. A Division Bench comprising Justices B N Chaturvedi and G S Sistani admitted Sumer Singh and Kothari Ram's appeal, challenging the trial court's conviction order and asked CBI to file its reply by January 23. Ten policemen, including the two convicts and the then ACP S S Rathi, were sentenced to life imprisonment for killing two businessmen -- Pradeep Goyal and Jagjit Singh -- at Barakhamba Road in New Delhi on March 31, 1997 in a fake encounter. Seeking suspension of sentence, the two constables contended that though they were part of the team that was hunting for the UP-based gangsters, the prosecution did not have any evidence against them and the trial court had failed to appreciate that. ACP Rathi and Inspector Anil Kumar have already filed their appeal against their conviction and the Bench has issued notice to CBI and listed the matter on January 23 next year. As per the CBI, the police team which was hunting for UP-based gangster Yaseen and his associate had gunned down Goyal and Singh by "indiscriminately" firing at the instruction of ACP Rathi without any provocation.
SC notice to Gujarat, Rajasthan in encounter killing
SC notice to Gujarat, Rajasthan in encounter killing8 Oct 2007, 1901 hrs IST,PTI
NEW DELHI: The Supreme Court on Monday issued notices to Gujarat and Rajasthan governments on a petition seeking CBI probe into the killing of Tulsiram Prajapati, the alleged accomplice of Sohrabuddin Sheikh, who was eliminated in a fake encounter. A Bench headed by Justice Tarun Chatterjee tagged the petition filed by Prajapati's mother with the petition in which it has been monitoring the investigation of fake encounter relating to the killing of Sheikh and his wife Kauser Bi. Prajapati was allegedly apprehended in a joint operation by the Gujarat and Rajasthan Police, while travelling in a bus along with Sohrabuddin and his wife from Hyderabad to Sangli in Maharashtra, in which the Andhra Pradesh Police had provided the logistic support. While Sohrabuddin was killed in Gujarat, Prajapati was allegedly shot dead by the police in Rajasthan. Meanwhile, a Bench headed by Chief Justice K G Balakrishnan also tagged with the Sohrabuddin Sheikh's matter the petition filed by veteran journalist B G Verghese seeking CBI probe into 21 incident of encounter killings in Gujarat since 2004.
NEW DELHI: The Supreme Court on Monday issued notices to Gujarat and Rajasthan governments on a petition seeking CBI probe into the killing of Tulsiram Prajapati, the alleged accomplice of Sohrabuddin Sheikh, who was eliminated in a fake encounter. A Bench headed by Justice Tarun Chatterjee tagged the petition filed by Prajapati's mother with the petition in which it has been monitoring the investigation of fake encounter relating to the killing of Sheikh and his wife Kauser Bi. Prajapati was allegedly apprehended in a joint operation by the Gujarat and Rajasthan Police, while travelling in a bus along with Sohrabuddin and his wife from Hyderabad to Sangli in Maharashtra, in which the Andhra Pradesh Police had provided the logistic support. While Sohrabuddin was killed in Gujarat, Prajapati was allegedly shot dead by the police in Rajasthan. Meanwhile, a Bench headed by Chief Justice K G Balakrishnan also tagged with the Sohrabuddin Sheikh's matter the petition filed by veteran journalist B G Verghese seeking CBI probe into 21 incident of encounter killings in Gujarat since 2004.
Judge hearing Soharabuddin case transferred
Judge hearing Soharabuddin case transferred19 Dec 2007, 1602 hrs IST,PTI
AHMEDABAD: The Gujarat High Court has transferred Additional Sessions and Designated POTA Court Judge Sonia Gokani, who was handling several important cases, including the Soharabuddin Sheikh fake encounter case. Gokani has been moved to the post of Registrar (Recruitment) in the High Court, official sources in the court said here on Wednesday. The court of Gokani had conducted trial of sensitive cases like the 2002 terrorist attack on Akshardham temple and assassination of former Minister of State for Home, Haren Pandya. The hearings in Soharabuddin case of November 2005 and rape and murder of Bijal Joshi on New Year's eve in 2003 were pending in the court of Gokani. The Sabarmati train burning case, in which 59 people were killed at Godhra on February 27, 2002, was also being heard by her till the Supreme Court stayed the hearing in the matter. The high court has also ordered transfer of three other judges.
AHMEDABAD: The Gujarat High Court has transferred Additional Sessions and Designated POTA Court Judge Sonia Gokani, who was handling several important cases, including the Soharabuddin Sheikh fake encounter case. Gokani has been moved to the post of Registrar (Recruitment) in the High Court, official sources in the court said here on Wednesday. The court of Gokani had conducted trial of sensitive cases like the 2002 terrorist attack on Akshardham temple and assassination of former Minister of State for Home, Haren Pandya. The hearings in Soharabuddin case of November 2005 and rape and murder of Bijal Joshi on New Year's eve in 2003 were pending in the court of Gokani. The Sabarmati train burning case, in which 59 people were killed at Godhra on February 27, 2002, was also being heard by her till the Supreme Court stayed the hearing in the matter. The high court has also ordered transfer of three other judges.
A PHILOSPHY OF JUDICIAL RESTRAINT STATECRAFT
A philosophy of judicial restraint statecraft DT. 18-12-07 THE HINDU
The observation by two judges on the limits of the judiciary’s power is a timely call to turn our back on judicial activism, bordering on political partisanship. Institutional balance and boundaries have to be intrinsically respected by all.
It was no surprise that within days of enunciation of the eminently reasonable A.K. Mathur-Markandey Katju doctrine of judicial reasonableness, Chief Justice K.G. Balakrishnan sought to reassert a maximalist view of what their Lordships can do or cannot do. The wise and sensible exhortation by the Mathur-Katju Bench was for the judiciary to rediscover “the self-imposed discipline of judicial restraint.” Perhaps it was intended to help dismount the judicial over reach tiger.
The only surprise was that it was the Chief Justice who deemed it advisable to suggest that the Mathur-Katju argument be spurned because Mr. Justice Balakrishnan himself has been suspected of abandoning the forward posts of public interest litigation. Yet no one is surprised because a very potent convergence over the years of institutional forces, intellectual impulses and politicised individuals has egged the higher judiciary to “behave like emperors”— to use the Mathur-Katju phrase — and this phalanx is not prepared to come down from the giddy heights of activism. Senior lawyers and other “civil society” voices have pitched in with dark hints of how unhealthy forces will run amok if they feel that the judiciary is unwilling to step in. In this perspective — essentially an upper caste/upper class prejudice — the higher judiciary is the only uncorrupted and incorruptible guardian of constitutional values and good governance.
The discord within at the very apex of the pyramid once again draws attention to the lack of jurisprudential coherence, an intellectual and doctrinal infirmity that puts all higher judges on the same Solomonic pedestal of wisdom and prudence. The only hint of gradation is in the numbers of judges behind a verdict: a three-judge Bench, say, is ipso facto deemed superior to a two-judge Bench, irrespective of the facts, arguments, explanations, judicial philosophy, clarity of prose, respect for precedents, constitutional history, etc. The device of a constitutional Bench too is no longer producing lasting jurisprudential benchmarks.
Given this institutional inability to produce jurisprudential coherence, it is only natural that the Mathur-Katju advice should have been seen as a call to close the PIL shop. There is a classic case of red herring. An independent, autonomous and vigorous judiciary is at the core of any democratic arrangement, and such a vigilant judiciary should always be available to the citizens against a callous administration. There is nothing in the Mathur-Katju judgment to suggest that the Supreme Court and the High Courts dilute the protection they provide to the citizen.
The reason why the Mathur-Katju observation has been greeted with so much disdain is that it seeks to remind everyone concerned of the creeping judicial waywardness. The point has been made by others; but this is the first time the reminder has come from two judges who have a reputation for independence and thoughtfulness. Not even the best defenders of judicial activism can be indifferent to recent controversies involving judicial personalities and pronouncements, bringing into disrepute the very institution.
The Mathur-Katju plea for judicial self-restraint is essentially a call for return to non-partisanship in the political arena. Given the far from perfect procedure for selection of judges for the higher judiciary, and given the near-total absence of any disciplinary mechanism against an errant judge, it is only natural and only a matter of time before the Bench starts departing from strict legal neutrality and personal disinterestedness. Involvement of judges with political parties after their retirement has distracted from the judiciary’s claim to political distance. Increasingly, the judges do not even want to wait till after retirement to indicate their political likes and dislikes.
Judicial protection
Take the case of the All-India Institute of Medical Sciences. Judicial protection was provided to a director, all in the name of protecting the AIIMS autonomy against presumed political interference. The institutional autonomy was interpreted as total independence for the director of a publicly-funded organisation against a Health Minister, unfamiliar with the pretensions and protocols of networking within the capital’s powerful elites. This “protection” became a licence for the director and his clique to join hands with political and ideological opponents of the Minister.
Because of the judicial protection, the AIIMS establishment felt encouraged to oppose a change in the reservation policy. This was pure and simple political partisanship. A section of the judiciary ended up protecting insubordination against the lawfully constituted constitutional authority, ultimately leading to an equally distasteful and drastic change by Parliament in the law governing the AIIMS.
At the core of the judicial involvement in the AIIMS was a larger itch: “Come to us — for protection.” And this is what the Mathur-Katju Bench sought to warn against: “Under our Constitution, the legislature, the executive and the judiciary all have their own broad spheres of operation. Ordinarily, it is not proper for any of these three organs of the state to encroach upon the domain of another, otherwise the delicate balance in the Constitution will be upset, and there will be a reaction.”
And “reaction” is already there. Only a few days before the Mathur-Katju observation, did the Lok Sabha have a long discussion on judicial over-activism, though the parliamentarians were reticent enough to call it a discussion on the “need for harmonious functioning of the three organs of state — legislature, judiciary and executive.” And if the leaders on the Bench and the Bar read a transcript of the debate, they would not miss the impatience and incomprehension with the ways and manners of the higher judiciary.
Perhaps those who man the portals of the higher judiciary have shrewdly calculated that the Indian polity will never recover from its present-day debilitating fragmentation, and will consequently never have the collective voice to challenge the judicial overreach. The Union Law Minister, who is otherwise highly respectful and appreciative of the Bench, told his colleagues during the debate: “I cannot criticise the judiciary. A Law Minister cannot ... but I can say with full responsibility that the supremacy of Parliament is not the same as it stood before Kesavananda Bharti’s case. The Ninth Schedule is in question nowadays. The other things are in question. Your resoluteness will be required. It is the firm voice of this House that is required…”
The Minister’s plea for parliamentary “resoluteness” is not a call for “confrontation” with the judiciary. It only gives expression to the creeping view that an imbalance has been allowed to come to define the governing mechanism in our complicated polity. A warning has been sounded.
In fact, the very fractured nature of the polity that gives the judiciary a larger institutional elbow room also sets in motion personalities and political parties which are least bothered by constitutional norms and precedents. If these new forces and personalities were to conclude that the judiciary decided to become a partisan voice, the very legitimacy and respectability of the constitutional arrangements would come into challenge.
True, higher judiciary is called upon to interpret the law and to sit in judgment on the legality and constitutional validity of a law. Equally true is that all constitutional interpretations have political consequences. Nonetheless, the requirement in a nascent democracy like ours remains that the judges perform their designated tasks in a manner as not to give the impression of their playing the politician’s game. The judicial role is and must remain distinct from the political. It is the politician who faces the consequences of his executive or legislative actions.
As a distinguished Chief Justice of Canada, Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin once wisely counselled: “It is not for judges to set the agendas for social change, or to impose their personal views on society. The role of judges is to support the rule of law, not the rule of judicial whim.”
The Mathur-Katju observation is an Indian version of the very obviously sensible advice, anchored in the realities and infirmities of our judicial system. Those who care for the autonomy and robustness of the Indian judiciary have an obligation to rediscover the usefulness of restraint — as well as the dangers of overreach.
It was no surprise that within days of enunciation of the eminently reasonable A.K. Mathur-Markandey Katju doctrine of judicial reasonableness, Chief Justice K.G. Balakrishnan sought to reassert a maximalist view of what their Lordships can do or cannot do. The wise and sensible exhortation by the Mathur-Katju Bench was for the judiciary to rediscover “the self-imposed discipline of judicial restraint.” Perhaps it was intended to help dismount the judicial over reach tiger.
The only surprise was that it was the Chief Justice who deemed it advisable to suggest that the Mathur-Katju argument be spurned because Mr. Justice Balakrishnan himself has been suspected of abandoning the forward posts of public interest litigation. Yet no one is surprised because a very potent convergence over the years of institutional forces, intellectual impulses and politicised individuals has egged the higher judiciary to “behave like emperors”— to use the Mathur-Katju phrase — and this phalanx is not prepared to come down from the giddy heights of activism. Senior lawyers and other “civil society” voices have pitched in with dark hints of how unhealthy forces will run amok if they feel that the judiciary is unwilling to step in. In this perspective — essentially an upper caste/upper class prejudice — the higher judiciary is the only uncorrupted and incorruptible guardian of constitutional values and good governance.
The discord within at the very apex of the pyramid once again draws attention to the lack of jurisprudential coherence, an intellectual and doctrinal infirmity that puts all higher judges on the same Solomonic pedestal of wisdom and prudence. The only hint of gradation is in the numbers of judges behind a verdict: a three-judge Bench, say, is ipso facto deemed superior to a two-judge Bench, irrespective of the facts, arguments, explanations, judicial philosophy, clarity of prose, respect for precedents, constitutional history, etc. The device of a constitutional Bench too is no longer producing lasting jurisprudential benchmarks.
Given this institutional inability to produce jurisprudential coherence, it is only natural that the Mathur-Katju advice should have been seen as a call to close the PIL shop. There is a classic case of red herring. An independent, autonomous and vigorous judiciary is at the core of any democratic arrangement, and such a vigilant judiciary should always be available to the citizens against a callous administration. There is nothing in the Mathur-Katju judgment to suggest that the Supreme Court and the High Courts dilute the protection they provide to the citizen.
The reason why the Mathur-Katju observation has been greeted with so much disdain is that it seeks to remind everyone concerned of the creeping judicial waywardness. The point has been made by others; but this is the first time the reminder has come from two judges who have a reputation for independence and thoughtfulness. Not even the best defenders of judicial activism can be indifferent to recent controversies involving judicial personalities and pronouncements, bringing into disrepute the very institution.
The Mathur-Katju plea for judicial self-restraint is essentially a call for return to non-partisanship in the political arena. Given the far from perfect procedure for selection of judges for the higher judiciary, and given the near-total absence of any disciplinary mechanism against an errant judge, it is only natural and only a matter of time before the Bench starts departing from strict legal neutrality and personal disinterestedness. Involvement of judges with political parties after their retirement has distracted from the judiciary’s claim to political distance. Increasingly, the judges do not even want to wait till after retirement to indicate their political likes and dislikes.
Judicial protection
Take the case of the All-India Institute of Medical Sciences. Judicial protection was provided to a director, all in the name of protecting the AIIMS autonomy against presumed political interference. The institutional autonomy was interpreted as total independence for the director of a publicly-funded organisation against a Health Minister, unfamiliar with the pretensions and protocols of networking within the capital’s powerful elites. This “protection” became a licence for the director and his clique to join hands with political and ideological opponents of the Minister.
Because of the judicial protection, the AIIMS establishment felt encouraged to oppose a change in the reservation policy. This was pure and simple political partisanship. A section of the judiciary ended up protecting insubordination against the lawfully constituted constitutional authority, ultimately leading to an equally distasteful and drastic change by Parliament in the law governing the AIIMS.
At the core of the judicial involvement in the AIIMS was a larger itch: “Come to us — for protection.” And this is what the Mathur-Katju Bench sought to warn against: “Under our Constitution, the legislature, the executive and the judiciary all have their own broad spheres of operation. Ordinarily, it is not proper for any of these three organs of the state to encroach upon the domain of another, otherwise the delicate balance in the Constitution will be upset, and there will be a reaction.”
And “reaction” is already there. Only a few days before the Mathur-Katju observation, did the Lok Sabha have a long discussion on judicial over-activism, though the parliamentarians were reticent enough to call it a discussion on the “need for harmonious functioning of the three organs of state — legislature, judiciary and executive.” And if the leaders on the Bench and the Bar read a transcript of the debate, they would not miss the impatience and incomprehension with the ways and manners of the higher judiciary.
Perhaps those who man the portals of the higher judiciary have shrewdly calculated that the Indian polity will never recover from its present-day debilitating fragmentation, and will consequently never have the collective voice to challenge the judicial overreach. The Union Law Minister, who is otherwise highly respectful and appreciative of the Bench, told his colleagues during the debate: “I cannot criticise the judiciary. A Law Minister cannot ... but I can say with full responsibility that the supremacy of Parliament is not the same as it stood before Kesavananda Bharti’s case. The Ninth Schedule is in question nowadays. The other things are in question. Your resoluteness will be required. It is the firm voice of this House that is required…”
The Minister’s plea for parliamentary “resoluteness” is not a call for “confrontation” with the judiciary. It only gives expression to the creeping view that an imbalance has been allowed to come to define the governing mechanism in our complicated polity. A warning has been sounded.
In fact, the very fractured nature of the polity that gives the judiciary a larger institutional elbow room also sets in motion personalities and political parties which are least bothered by constitutional norms and precedents. If these new forces and personalities were to conclude that the judiciary decided to become a partisan voice, the very legitimacy and respectability of the constitutional arrangements would come into challenge.
True, higher judiciary is called upon to interpret the law and to sit in judgment on the legality and constitutional validity of a law. Equally true is that all constitutional interpretations have political consequences. Nonetheless, the requirement in a nascent democracy like ours remains that the judges perform their designated tasks in a manner as not to give the impression of their playing the politician’s game. The judicial role is and must remain distinct from the political. It is the politician who faces the consequences of his executive or legislative actions.
As a distinguished Chief Justice of Canada, Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin once wisely counselled: “It is not for judges to set the agendas for social change, or to impose their personal views on society. The role of judges is to support the rule of law, not the rule of judicial whim.”
The Mathur-Katju observation is an Indian version of the very obviously sensible advice, anchored in the realities and infirmities of our judicial system. Those who care for the autonomy and robustness of the Indian judiciary have an obligation to rediscover the usefulness of restraint — as well as the dangers of overreach.
Punjab Govt. may move Supreme Court
Punjab Govt. may move Supreme Court
The Punjab Government on Tuesday said it will consider moving the Supreme Court against a High Court ruling that Sikhs were not a minority community in seeking admission to Sikh institutions run by SGPC in the State.
“We are considering going for appeal (against the Punjab and Haryana High court ruling) in the Supreme Court,” Punjab’s Advocate General H. S. Mattewal said here.
He said the case involved an important legal issue and they were going into all aspects of it.
“We are still going through the whole judgment and will take a decision soon (on moving Apex Court),” he said.
“It is a case which needs to be tested in the Supreme Court, have a final verdict on the issue because the question of majority and minority are a matter of fact”, he said.
Mr. Mattewal also said the SGPC, apex religious body of the Sikhs, had become an inter-state body after the Punjab Re-organisation Act and was also serving the states of Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and Chandigarh.
A Division Bench of the High Court had on Monday declared as ultra vires of the Constitution the notification issued by Punjab Government declaring SGPC-run Sikh institutions as minority institutions.
“We are considering going for appeal (against the Punjab and Haryana High court ruling) in the Supreme Court,” Punjab’s Advocate General H. S. Mattewal said here.
He said the case involved an important legal issue and they were going into all aspects of it.
“We are still going through the whole judgment and will take a decision soon (on moving Apex Court),” he said.
“It is a case which needs to be tested in the Supreme Court, have a final verdict on the issue because the question of majority and minority are a matter of fact”, he said.
Mr. Mattewal also said the SGPC, apex religious body of the Sikhs, had become an inter-state body after the Punjab Re-organisation Act and was also serving the states of Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and Chandigarh.
A Division Bench of the High Court had on Monday declared as ultra vires of the Constitution the notification issued by Punjab Government declaring SGPC-run Sikh institutions as minority institutions.
LIFE IMPRISONMENT FOR PRAVEEN MAHAJAN
Life term for Pravin Mahajan DT. 18-12-07
Sessions Judge S.P. Davare on Tuesday sentenced Pravin Mahajan to life imprisonment for killing his brother and Bharatiya Janata Party leader Pramod Mahajan. The judge did not accept the prosecution argument that it was the rarest of rare case deserving death.
On Monday, the court held Pravin guilty of murder under Sections 302 (murder) and 449 (house trespass) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
On April 22, 2006, Pravin shot Pramod, who died of injuries on May 3, 2006.
The order said that “after drawing a balance sheet of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and considering the background of the family of the victim,” it was of the considered view that “the offence of murder is not in the rarest of rare category.”
The extreme penalty need not be inflicted as it was not the gravest case of extreme culpability. For an offence under Section 302 of the IPC “imprisonment for life shall meet the ends of justice.”
The court also took into account the fact that the accused was the sole breadwinner of the family. Pravin was also sentenced to five years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.5,000 under Section 449 of the IPC. The sentences will run concurrently. Mr. Davare asked Pravin if he had anything to say on the quantum of sentence, to which he said no.
Earlier, Special Public Prosecutor Ujjwal Nikam demanded the death penalty, saying this was not merely a cold-blooded murder, but a “frozen-blooded murder.” It was planned, and the accused deserved no leniency.
Sessions Judge S.P. Davare on Tuesday sentenced Pravin Mahajan to life imprisonment for killing his brother and Bharatiya Janata Party leader Pramod Mahajan. The judge did not accept the prosecution argument that it was the rarest of rare case deserving death.
On Monday, the court held Pravin guilty of murder under Sections 302 (murder) and 449 (house trespass) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
On April 22, 2006, Pravin shot Pramod, who died of injuries on May 3, 2006.
The order said that “after drawing a balance sheet of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and considering the background of the family of the victim,” it was of the considered view that “the offence of murder is not in the rarest of rare category.”
The extreme penalty need not be inflicted as it was not the gravest case of extreme culpability. For an offence under Section 302 of the IPC “imprisonment for life shall meet the ends of justice.”
The court also took into account the fact that the accused was the sole breadwinner of the family. Pravin was also sentenced to five years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.5,000 under Section 449 of the IPC. The sentences will run concurrently. Mr. Davare asked Pravin if he had anything to say on the quantum of sentence, to which he said no.
Earlier, Special Public Prosecutor Ujjwal Nikam demanded the death penalty, saying this was not merely a cold-blooded murder, but a “frozen-blooded murder.” It was planned, and the accused deserved no leniency.
Tuesday, December 18, 2007
SC refuses permission to print Shilpa story18 Dec 2007, 0217 hrs IST,TNN
SC refuses permission to print Shilpa story18 Dec 2007, 0217 hrs IST,TNN
NEW DELHI: The Supreme Court has refused to grant permission to a magazine to reprint details of the personal life of actress Shilpa Shetty, much before she caught international media attention for being part of a British TV reality show. Three articles on Shetty's personal life were published by a film magazine. She had slapped a Rs 20 crore damage suit against the publication and the Bombay High Court had restrained the publishers from re-printing these articles which alleged that the actress was having "a relationship with other actors or a married man". The publishers had in 2002 appealed in SC against the HC order, which had further clarified that a person couldn't be defamed by allowing re-publication of the alleged articles in future. Refusing to alter the HC order, an SC Bench comprising Justices Arijit Pasayat and P Sathasivam asked the HC to explore possibility of early disposal of suit filed by Shetty in 2001.
NEW DELHI: The Supreme Court has refused to grant permission to a magazine to reprint details of the personal life of actress Shilpa Shetty, much before she caught international media attention for being part of a British TV reality show. Three articles on Shetty's personal life were published by a film magazine. She had slapped a Rs 20 crore damage suit against the publication and the Bombay High Court had restrained the publishers from re-printing these articles which alleged that the actress was having "a relationship with other actors or a married man". The publishers had in 2002 appealed in SC against the HC order, which had further clarified that a person couldn't be defamed by allowing re-publication of the alleged articles in future. Refusing to alter the HC order, an SC Bench comprising Justices Arijit Pasayat and P Sathasivam asked the HC to explore possibility of early disposal of suit filed by Shetty in 2001.
Court's power to pull up police- courts are above police
Court pulls up police in Mona murder case
NEW DELHI: The Delhi police were pulled up by a court here on Monday for shoddy investigation of the Mona Suri murder case.
The court, which had summoned an Assistant Commissioner of Police, directed him to personally supervise the case and return with a status report on December 22.
Metropolitan Magistrate Tarun Kumar Sehrawat asked ACP Ram Gopal Naik why the police had not recorded statements of the victim’s relatives when the force had all the resources at its disposal. The court told the ACP that it was a serious matter and that he should take care of it.
While seeking some more time for recording of statements, the ACP the court that the investigations would be speeded up.
Mona’s father Manjeet Bawa had alleged in a petition that the police were not investigating the case properly. It was alleged that despite a diary being recovered from the residence of the victim, in which she had hinted at her husband Naveen Suri ill-treating her and having an affair with his colleague, the police had not probed that angle properly.
Mona, a fashion designer, had suffered burn injuries when two unidentified young men on a motorcycle poured kerosene on her and set her afire outside her residence at Greater Kailash in South Delhi on August 12. She succumbed to her injuries on October 21 in Safdarjung Hospital.
Legal Juris Criminal Sec. 482 Cr.P.C.
Be circumspect in quashing criminal cases: Supreme Court
“Interfere only to prevent abuse of process of court”
“The High Court should be extremely cautious and slow to interfere with the investigation and/or trial of criminal cases and should not stall the investigation except when it is convinced beyond doubt that the FIR does not disclose commission of any offence or … that it is necessary to interfere to prevent abuse of the process of the court,” said a Bench consisting of Justice S. B. Sinha and Justice G. S. Singhvi.Detrimental
Writing the judgment, Mr. Justice Singhvi said: “In dealing with such cases, the High Court has to bear in mind that judicial intervention on the threshold of the legal process initiated against a person accused of committing an offence is highly detrimental to the larger public and societal interest. The people and society have a legitimate expectation that those committing offences against either an individual or society are expeditiously brought to trial and, if found guilty, adequately punished.”
“While deciding a petition filed for quashing the FIR or complaint or restraining the competent authority from investigating the allegations contained in the FIR or complaint or for stalling the trial, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect. If the allegations contained in the FIR or the complaint disclose commission of some crime, then the High Court must keep its hands off and allow the investigating agency to complete the investigation without any fetter and also refrain from passing order which may impede the trial,” said the Bench.No imaginary journey
The High Court should not go into the merits and demerits of the allegations simply because the petitioner alleged “malus animus [evil intention] against the author of the FIR or the complainant”.
“It must also refrain from an imaginary journey in the realm of possible harassment of the petitioner because of the investigation of the FIR or complaint. Such a course would result in miscarriage of justice and encourage those accused of committing crimes to repeat the same,” it added.
In the instant case, Sanapareddy Maheedhar and another person challenged an Andhra Pradesh High Court order rejecting their petition for quashing criminal proceedings against them for dowry offences. Cognisance
It was argued that the magistrate ought not to have taken cognisance of the alleged commission of the offence four years after it occurred, particularly when a U.S. court granted divorce and Maheedhar’s family returned the gift articles to the family of Bhavani Shireesha, wife of Maheedhar. It was also submitted that after the divorce Bhavani remarried.
Agreeing with the appellants’ submissions and setting aside the impugned judgment, the Bench said: “If the High Court is satisfied that the complaint does not disclose commission of any offence or prosecution is barred by limitation or that the proceedings of criminal case would result in failure of justice, then it may exercise the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.PC.” Peculiar facts
In the peculiar facts of this case, continuance of the proceedings before the trial court would amount to abuse of the process of court, the Bench said quashing the proceedings.
Praveen Mahajan Conviction for murdering Pramod Mahanjan dt. 18-12-07
Praveen Mahajan Conviction for murdering Pramod Mahanjan dt. 18-12-07
A Sessions Court here on Monday convicted Pravin Mahajan (48) of killing his elder brother and Bharatiya Janata Party leader Pramod Mahajan. On Tuesday, the prosecution will present its arguments on the quantum of sentence.
Pravin was convicted under Section 302 (murder) of the Indian Penal Code and Section 449 (house trespass).
The court said the prosecution had proved his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. While rejecting money as the motive for the crime, it accepted the threatening SMS (short messaging service) Pravin sent to Pramod a week before the incident. The message said: “Now there will be no pleading or prayers. It is war now and it will end in either victory or death.”
The court relied on the eye-witness accounts of Pramod’s wife Rekha Mahajan and the domestic help Mahesh Wankhede. The case was also supported by Pramod’s dying declaration in the presence of his brother-in-law and BJP leader Gopinath Munde.
On April 22, 2006, Pravin went to his brother’s residence at Purna building in Worli and fired thrice at him from a pistol. Pramod died in hospital on May 3, 2006 of multiple organ failure.
Ms. Rekha Mahajan testified that she saw Pravin firing the third round. Also, Pravin demanded Rs.1 crore from her husband and threatened him, she said.
Pravin surrendered at the Worli police station after the incident and the charge sheet was filed on July 14, 2006. Three supplementary charge sheets were filed later.
The trial, which began in March, witnessed many twists and turns. A portion of the trial was held in camera as Pravin made personal allegations against Pramod. It was during Mr. Munde’s testimony that the issue of the threatening SMS came up. Police filed a supplementary charge sheet on this later.
The court said the shooting was corroborated by other circumstantial and consistent evidence, besides testimonies of medical, ballistic and handwriting experts.
“The prosecution case inspires every confidence and leads to the inescapable conclusion that the accused committed the crimes of which he has been charged,” the court said.
An impassive Pravin, clad in spotless white, said he was not surprised at the order as he had been listening to it being dictated for the past 10 days.
None from Pramod’s family was present when the verdict was read out.“Will challenge verdict”
Pravin’s wife Sarangi told reporters that they would challenge the verdict in the High Court. Pravin has pleaded not guilty to the murder charge.
Special Public Prosecutor Ujjwal Nikam told reporters that it was a victory for the prosecution as the accused was convicted of wilful murder.
He said the defence was trying to pick holes in the case but that did not work in its favour.
The defence said it was an accidental firing caused in a scuffle between the brothers. It also tried to prove that an SMS could be fabricated.
A Sessions Court here on Monday convicted Pravin Mahajan (48) of killing his elder brother and Bharatiya Janata Party leader Pramod Mahajan. On Tuesday, the prosecution will present its arguments on the quantum of sentence.
Pravin was convicted under Section 302 (murder) of the Indian Penal Code and Section 449 (house trespass).
The court said the prosecution had proved his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. While rejecting money as the motive for the crime, it accepted the threatening SMS (short messaging service) Pravin sent to Pramod a week before the incident. The message said: “Now there will be no pleading or prayers. It is war now and it will end in either victory or death.”
The court relied on the eye-witness accounts of Pramod’s wife Rekha Mahajan and the domestic help Mahesh Wankhede. The case was also supported by Pramod’s dying declaration in the presence of his brother-in-law and BJP leader Gopinath Munde.
On April 22, 2006, Pravin went to his brother’s residence at Purna building in Worli and fired thrice at him from a pistol. Pramod died in hospital on May 3, 2006 of multiple organ failure.
Ms. Rekha Mahajan testified that she saw Pravin firing the third round. Also, Pravin demanded Rs.1 crore from her husband and threatened him, she said.
Pravin surrendered at the Worli police station after the incident and the charge sheet was filed on July 14, 2006. Three supplementary charge sheets were filed later.
The trial, which began in March, witnessed many twists and turns. A portion of the trial was held in camera as Pravin made personal allegations against Pramod. It was during Mr. Munde’s testimony that the issue of the threatening SMS came up. Police filed a supplementary charge sheet on this later.
The court said the shooting was corroborated by other circumstantial and consistent evidence, besides testimonies of medical, ballistic and handwriting experts.
“The prosecution case inspires every confidence and leads to the inescapable conclusion that the accused committed the crimes of which he has been charged,” the court said.
An impassive Pravin, clad in spotless white, said he was not surprised at the order as he had been listening to it being dictated for the past 10 days.
None from Pramod’s family was present when the verdict was read out.“Will challenge verdict”
Pravin’s wife Sarangi told reporters that they would challenge the verdict in the High Court. Pravin has pleaded not guilty to the murder charge.
Special Public Prosecutor Ujjwal Nikam told reporters that it was a victory for the prosecution as the accused was convicted of wilful murder.
He said the defence was trying to pick holes in the case but that did not work in its favour.
The defence said it was an accidental firing caused in a scuffle between the brothers. It also tried to prove that an SMS could be fabricated.
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